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I. INTRODUCTION
Bogus refund schemes, i.e., schemes created to generate undeserved
tax refunds, have long plagued the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 1 In
2011-2013, the IRS identified and stopped over $53 billion fraudulent
refunds, yet paid over $10 billion in fraudulent refunds during the same
period. 2 Those bogus refunds, however, are not a new phenomenon: a
2005 report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(“TIGTA”) to Congress noted that in that year, there were approximately
70,000 bogus claims for refund, totaling over $100 million.3 By 2007,
the Joint Committee on Taxation (the “Joint Committee”), echoing
TIGTA’s concerns, told Congress that bogus refund claims had created
“unnecessary burdens on both taxpayers and the IRS by straining IRS
resources and impeding effective tax administration.” 4

1. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Closing the Tax Gap: Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85 (2009); George Guttman, Improper Refunds Sapping Billions; IRS,
Treasury, Hill Seek Answers, 65 TAX NOTES 19, 20 (1994); Malcolm K. Sparrow, 1993 Report on
IRS Vulnerability to Refund Fraud, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 20, 1996, at 35-51, § 2.3.1; William J.
Turnier, Electronic Filing: A Very Dubious Success, 59 TAX NOTES 569 (1993).
2. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INTERIM RESULTS OF THE 2014 FILING
SEASON
(2014),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/
201440029fr.html. See also Gregory Wallace, IRS Paid $3.6 Billion in Fraudulent Tax Refunds,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 7, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/07/pf/taxes/irs-fraud/ (“The IRS paid
out $3.6 billion in fraudulent tax refunds to identity thieves last year, according to an inspector
general report.”).
3. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
APRIL 1, 2005-SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/
semiannual_dec2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 TIGTA REPORT].
4. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET PROPOSAL 186 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 2007
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In response to both TIGTA’s and the Joint Committee’s concerns,
in 2007, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section
6676, 5 which gave the IRS the power to penalize erroneous and
fraudulent refund claims. 6 Congress later amended section 6676 in 2010,
extending the section 6676 refund penalty to refund claims based on
transactions lacking economic substance. 7
While well-intentioned, section 6676 has been feckless. 8 For the
five years between May 2007 and May 2012, the IRS assessed only 84
section 6676 erroneous refund penalties, collecting roughly $1.9
million. 9 However, TIGTA found that for the approximately one-year
period between June 3, 2012 and May 25, 2013, “the IRS could have
potentially assessed erroneous penalties totaling more than $1.5
billion.” 10 This Article explains why those potential penalties have not

JCT REPORT].
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to “section” refer to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8247, 121
Stat. 112, 204 [hereinafter Work Opportunity Tax Act].
7. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1409(d), 124
Stat. 1029, 1070. Prior to 2007, there was no penalty for filing an “excessive” claim for a tax refund
under section 6676. The predecessor of the current penalty based on erroneous claims for refund
was first mentioned in a September 15, 2006 Senate bill that was ultimately not passed. See S. 1321,
109th Cong. (2006). That bill proposed a 20% penalty for an erroneous claim for refund, and the
authors of the bill stated as the reason for the bill, “the filing of erroneous refund claims is being
used by some taxpayers to put a strain on IRS resources and to delay the resolution of tax matters.”
S. COMM. ON FINANCE, TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX REPEAL AND TAXPAYER PROTECTION AND
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2006, S. REP. NO. 109-336 (2006).
8. Instead of fixing the penalty, at least one member of Congress is seeking to expand it. In
2013, Rep. Jerry McNerney (D-CA) introduced H.R. 2740, the “Stop Outsourcing and Create
American Jobs Act of 2013.” The bill would amend the section 6676 penalties by adding a new
penalty for corporations claiming refunds related to tax haven countries. The text of the bill, in
pertinent part, would redesignate subsection (d) as subsection (e) by inserting after subsection (c)
the following new subsection:
(d) INCREASE IN PENALTY IN CASE OF TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES.—In the case
of claim or credit by a corporation for any excessive amount due for credits or refunds
involving funds held or invested in a tax haven country (as defined in section
6662(k)(2)), subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting “40 percent” for “20
percent.”
Stop Outsourcing and Create American Jobs Act of 2013, H.R. 2740, 113th Cong., § 3(d).
9. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE LAW WHICH PENALIZES ERRONEOUS
REFUND AND CREDIT CLAIMS WAS NOT PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED 2 (2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340123fr.pdf [hereinafter 2013 TIGTA
REPORT).
10. Id.
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been assessed.
Part of the blame for section 6676’s ineffectiveness is a lack of
guidance regarding implementation, and that blame falls squarely at the
feet of both the IRS and the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”). 11
Since enactment, Treasury has failed to issue implementing regulations
for section 6676, relying instead on the IRS to, in effect, make it up as
they go along. That has not worked out so well. The IRS, in making it
up, got it wrong at least twice and left its employees largely in the dark
about how the penalty should be implemented. 12
Another part of the blame goes to Congress, which failed to think
through material issues regarding section 6676’s purpose before passing
it. 13 As noted by the Joint Committee, the bogus refund claims
highlighted in the 2005 TIGTA report were a major impetus for passing
section 6676. 14 Among other findings, that report found that taxpayers
fraudulently claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) were a
significant part of the bogus refund problem. 15 So what did Congress
do? It passed a refund claim penalty that excluded EITC-based refund
claims.
The Joint Committee also foretold of the problems with
administering the penalty, noting “the proposal (i.e., the new penalty)
may lead to some additional complexity in the administration of the
penalty provisions. For example, administration of the new penalty may
be impacted by uncertainty regarding its application in cases in which
present-law penalties also might apply.” 16 Those prescient sentences
presaged the morass that is the current state of section 6676.
In 2013, TIGTA identified steps the IRS could take to correct its
internal procedures to properly impose the penalty. In addition, based on

11. The IRS is a bureau of Treasury, and section 7805(a) gives Treasury the power to create
the necessary rules and regulations for enforcing the Code. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
12. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9. Specifically, the report noted that section 6676
penalties have not been assessed because (i) IRS administration failed to provide guidance to
employees about when the penalty should be assessed, and (ii) IRS Counsel provided incorrect legal
guidance to IRS employees regarding the IRS’s authority to assess the erroneous refund penalty. Id.
at 10.
13. See Christine S. Hooks, Spotlight on the Penalty for Excessive Refund Claims, I.R.C. §
6676, INSIDE BASIS, Spring 2013, at 5, 5, available at http://www.fedbar.org/imagelibrary/events/2013-Annual-Meeting/Newsletter-Winners/TAX.pdf (“Despite the breadth of the
penalty provision, it appears that Congress had in mind only a few types of excessive erroneous
refund claims when it enacted the penalty.”).
14. The 2005 TIGTA Report is cited in the first line of the “Analysis” section of the 2007 JCT
Report. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
15. See 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
16. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
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discussions with IRS administrators, TIGTA noted that the IRS would
seek to implement section 6676 penalties more aggressively in the
future. 17 Notwithstanding TIGTA’s suggested corrections, aggressive
implementation only portends more problematic issues for section 6676,
including: (1) the law is beset with unaddressed structural problems; (2)
as drafted, implementation may violate the U.S. Constitution; and (3)
well-represented taxpayers may be able to avoid the penalty. As one
headline regarding the current state of affairs regarding the section 6676
penalty noted, it is “A Tax Morass Only a Lawyer Could Love.” 18
This Article analyzes the problems with section 6676 as it currently
applies and offers suggestions to change it. The Article begins by
identifying the reasons section 6676 has been unable to accomplish its
policy goals and then highlights problems on the horizon. It ends by
suggesting legislative and regulatory changes that will ameliorate the
problems with section 6676 and allow the law to accomplish the goals
Congress sought to achieve through its enactment.
Part II of this Article lays out the problems associated with
erroneous claims for refund and past legislative attempts to deal with the
problem, ultimately leading to the enactment of section 6676. Part II also
explains generally how section 6676 differs from most other tax penalty
provisions, and how those differences have hampered its
implementation.
Part III examines the problematic legal and policy issues the section
6676 penalty raises. Part III.A explores administrative problems with the
section 6676 penalty, and begins with an examination of the issues that
have arisen regarding the penalty’s procedure and implementation.
Many of those problems were on the horizon when the law was passed,
but, to date, have not been addressed. 19 One issue, regarding how to
properly calculate the section 6676 penalty, was recently addressed by
the U.S. Tax Court (“Tax Court”), and not in the government’s favor.
Using the Three Stooges as an example, the section demonstrates how
17. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9. The report noted that the IRS stated, in response
to TIGTA’s recommendation, that “a cross-functional team of affected stakeholders will determine
the operational and procedural changes needed to integrate assessment of the erroneous refund
penalty into the Campus Operations.” Id. at 2. My understanding of that corporate-speak suggests
this is how the IRS states it will try to do better in the future.
18. Ilya Shapiro & Matt Gilliam, A Tax Morass Only a Lawyer Could Love, AMERICAN (Dec.
10, 2012), available at http://www.american.com/archive/2012/december/a-tax-morass-only-alawyer-could-love.
19. In what should be a textbook definition of understatement, the Joint Committee stated in
2007 that, “depending on certain details of the proposal [section 6676] that have not yet been
specified, the proposal may lead to some additional complexity in the administration of the penalty
provisions.” 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
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that Tax Court decision increased exponentially the procedural and
administrative complexity of implementing section 6676.
Part IV analyzes a number of outstanding legal and policy issues
raised by section 6676. The section begins by examining how imposing
the section 6676 penalties may not pass constitutional muster. Briefly,
requesting a tax refund is a well-established, constitutionally-recognized
form of First Amendment petitioning activity, and any infringement
upon that right must provide certain procedural safeguards. As currently
implemented, section 6676 has no such safeguards. The section then
explores other unresolved legal and policy issues on the horizon for
section 6676.
Part IV.C explains a more practical problem with section 6676: the
penalty may be avoidable by well-represented taxpayers. The section
demonstrates how taxpayers and their counsel, by skillfully navigating
the sometimes Byzantine procedural aspects of tax litigation may
structure their refund requests in such a way that could leave the IRS
powerless to impose the penalty. Such tactics would make section 6676
a de facto poor people’s tax, applicable only to those who lacked the
skill and sophistication to avoid it. That cannot be what Congress
intended.
Part V suggests legislative and regulatory changes to section 6676
that would not only ameliorate the procedural and administrative
problems, but also satisfy the goals identified by TIGTA and the Joint
Committee. Those changes seek to balance the government’s need to
address the problem of bogus refund claims with both taxpayers’ and the
IRS’s need for clear rules and procedures. Lastly, Part VI offers a
conclusion, as well as a hope for a more effective law.
II. TAX PENALTIES, REFUNDS AND TAX SHELTERS
For the most part, taxpayers are rational. They will not engage in
behaviors, such as cheating on their taxes, if the expected costs of those
actions outweigh the benefits. 20 One item on the cost side of that costbenefit calculation is tax penalties, which increase the cost of cheating. 21
20. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1783 (2000):
A simple approach to the problem of tax compliance holds that when people decide whether to pay
their taxes, they take account only of the cost of the tax and of the expected legal sanction from
noncompliance. If the expected sanction exceeds the tax payment, the person will pay; otherwise, he
will not.
21. Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in
the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 381, 395

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/3

6

Wright: Bugus Refunds & Bad Penalties
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

BOGUS REFUNDS & BAD PENALTIES

10/21/2015 11:57 AM

553

According to the IRS Internal Revenue Manual (the “IRM”),
“[P]enalties exist to encourage voluntary compliance by supporting the
standards of behavior required by the Internal Revenue Code.” 22
Although often spun using the positive terminology of encouraging
voluntary compliance, the reality is that penalties serve as a deterrent to
intentional non-compliance. The deterrent effect is particularly necessary
in the tax context, because the chance of the IRS detecting noncompliance is relatively small. In 2010, for example, the overall
probability of audit for individual taxpayers was just over 1%. 23 Absent
a penalty, there would be no rational (as opposed to a moral or ethical)
reason for a taxpayer to comply with tax laws, because the taxpayer
would have a 99% chance of his non-compliance going undetected. 24
A.

Refund Schemes

Based on the 2007 Joint Committee report, the focus of section
6676 was bogus refund schemes, i.e., individuals filing fraudulent tax
returns to claim an undeserved refund. For purposes of this Article,
individuals seeking fraudulent refunds will be called “Fraudsters.”
Section 6676 was amended in 2010 to include transactions lacking
economic substance. That amendment was part of broader legislation
ostensibly aimed at discouraging tax shelters and other tax avoidance
transactions by high net worth individuals and corporations. As
amended, section 6676 imposed a penalty on those seeking tax refunds
by gaming the tax system with sophisticated tax shelters and other tax
avoidance transactions. For purposes of this Article, those seeking to
game the tax system through sophisticated tax avoidance transactions
will be called “Gamers.”
Between the Fraudsters and the Gamers are the vast majority of

(2006) (“in the absence of penalties or when the probability of penalties is much less than unity,
taxpayers who are not risk-averse will be expected to enter into tax-motivated transactions”).
22. IRM 20.1.1.2.1(5) (Aug. 5, 2014). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO09-567, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS 3 (2009)
(noting that, “in order to advance the fairness and effectiveness of the tax system, penalties should
be severe enough to deter noncompliance, encourage noncompliant taxpayers to comply, be
objectively proportioned to the offense, and be used to educate taxpayers and encourage their future
compliance”).
23. See IRS, DATA BOOK, 2010, at 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/10databk.pdf (providing that as of 2010, the chance of audit for all individual taxpayers was
about 1.1%).
24. For a more detailed analysis of taxpayers’ cost-benefit analysis, see Del Wright Jr.,
Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil the IRS (And
How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 654-59 (2013).
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taxpayers who improperly seek tax refunds based on a mistake of law or
fact. This group of taxpayers generally cannot afford tax lawyers to help
them navigate the sometimes difficult provisions of the Code. For
purposes of this Article, this group will use the sobriquet “99
Percenters.”
One subgroup of the 99 Percenters is particularly relevant for
purposes of this article: those seeking tax refunds based on refundable
tax credits. A refundable tax credit (a “refundable credit”) is a tax credit
that the IRS treats as a cash-equivalent payment. Thus, if the amount of
a refundable credit exceeds a taxpayer’s tax liability, the government
will pay the excess to the taxpayer as a refund. Refundable credits are
unlike the majority of tax credits, which are nonrefundable. Those
nonrefundable credits may reduce a taxpayer’s federal income tax
liability to zero, but any excess credits are not refunded to the taxpayer.
“Most refundable tax credits were created to meet social policy
goals, such as providing income support for low-income households,
expanding health insurance coverage, or increasing college
enrollment.” 25 For the most part, they were enacted to assist working
people in the low-to-middle income ranges, and phase out at upper
incomes. For the purposes of this Article, taxpayers eligible to claim
refundable credits are referred to as “Strivers.” Though designed for
Fraudsters and Gamers, section 6676 applies effectively only to Strivers.
1. Fraudster Refund Schemes
“Although the government can be slow to build roads and fix budgets,
26
it can issue tax [refunds] within days”

In 2013, CNN reported that tax refund fraud has “ballooned” in
recent years, increasing over 400% from $166 million in 2007 to $758
million in 2010 (the latest year available at the time).27 TIGTA estimates
25. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 2 (2013), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43767_RefundableTaxCredits_2012_0.pdf.
Recent
refundable credits include the Earned Income Credit, the Excess Social Security Credit, the
Additional Child Tax Credit, the Health Coverage Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Credit
(which is only partly refundable).
26. See David Wolman, Beware of Gangsters Filing Tax Returns, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/tax-refund-fraudfake-returns-net-gangsters-millions. The article noted incorrectly that the government can issue tax
“returns,” not “refunds.”
27. See Blake Ellis, Prisoners Rake in Millions from Tax Fraud, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30,
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/17/pf/taxes/prisoner-tax-fraud/. This problem is not just a
recent one. In its 2005 report to Congress, TIGTA noted that “refund fraud committed by prisoners
is growing at an alarming rate. The number of false returns from prisoners identified by the IRS
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refund fraud has since grown to $2.3 billion in 2011, and forecasts, as of
December 2013, “approximately $11.4 billion in fraudulent refunds over
the next five years.” 28
One reason refund fraud has proliferated is the ease with which
savvy criminals (Fraudsters) can file a false tax return and request a
bogus refund. For the most part, all Fraudsters need to make bogus
refund requests are “real Social Security numbers, dates of birth, bank
account information, addresses, and an Internet connection.” 29 The ease
of using the tax system to steal from the government has not been lost on
criminal syndicates. According to Businessweek, “[O]rganized crime has
learned that stealing from the federal government [through tax fraud] can
be easier and more lucrative than dealing drugs.” 30
“But he that filches from me my good name, Robs me of that which not
enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.”
— Shakespeare, Othello, act iii. Sc. 3.

Unsurprisingly, many Fraudster refund schemes are linked to
identity theft. 31 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
grew” from 4,300 returns to over 18,000 returns in a two-year period, and the IRS only screened
about “36,000 of the 455,000 prisoner refund returns.” 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
Since that report, the number of fraudulent prisoner tax returns has again more than doubled from
the over 18,000 identified in the 2005 TIGTA Report to approximately 50,000 identified by the IRS
in 2009. See Press Release, Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., IRS Efforts to Identify
Prisoner Tax Refund Fraud: Significant Problems Persist, TIGTA Finds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY
(Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2011-1.htm. Fraudulent refunds
claimed rose from $68.1 million to $295.1 million during the same period. The IRS’s number likely
understates the problem. The 2009 TIGTA Report noted that the IRS data was limited to only those
tax returns the IRS identified and chose to evaluate for fraud. TIGTA identified 540,984 tax returns
that were filed by prisoners in 2009, of which 54,410 were not identified by the IRS as having been
filed by a prisoner. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
STILL EXIST WITH INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY PRISONER TAX REFUND
FRAUD
(2010),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/
201140009fr.pdf.
28. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STOLEN AND FALSELY OBTAINED
EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS ARE USED TO REPORT FALSE INCOME AND WITHHOLDING
(2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340120fr.pdf.
29. Wolman, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. “Identity theft,” as defined by the IRS, is:
the use of another person’s identifying information stolen from a wide variety of places and through
a wide variety of means. With respect to the IRS, identity theft manifests itself in several ways.
First, it is used to defraud the government of funds through the filing of fraudulent refund claims.
Second, in many instances it victimizes an innocent taxpayer by impeding his or her ability to get a
refund from us. Fraudulent filings may also cause us to initiate an adverse enforcement action
against the innocent taxpayer.
See Hearing on Identity Theft and Return Preparer Fraud Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
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(“FBI”), “this type of crime is perceived by criminals and organized
criminal enterprises as relatively easy, seemingly low-risk, and,
ultimately, pure profit which can be used to fund other criminal
activities . . . like drug trafficking, money laundering, public corruption,
or even terrorism.” 32
From 2008 through May 2012, more than 550,000 taxpayers have
had their identities stolen for the purpose of claiming bogus refunds. 33
From 2011 through November 2013, the IRS believes its efforts have
prevented the issuance of over $50 billion in bogus refunds based on
identity theft. 34
While clearly illegal, Fraudster refund schemes are exceedingly
difficult to detect and prosecute. The IRS has hundreds of millions of
returns to process and must maintain a delicate balance: to minimize
fraud and abuse but, at the same time, not unduly delay tax refunds. 35
A significant factor in the proliferation of Fraudster refund schemes
was that, before the enactment of section 6676, there was almost no
sanction to filing a bogus request. 36 As noted in the 2007 Joint
Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (June 28, 2012) (written
testimony of Rebecca Sparkman, Dir., Operations, Policy & Support Criminal Investigation Div.,
IRS),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/Hearings%202012/Sparkman%2006282012.pdf
[hereinafter Sparkman Testimony].
32. See Investigating Tax Refund Fraud, FBI Works Cooperatively with Federal Partners,
FBI STORIES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/march/investigating-taxrefund-fraud/investigating-tax-refund-fraud.
33. See Sparkman Testimony, supra note 31, at 3. See also Press Release, Office of Public
Affairs, Justice Department Highlights Efforts to Combat Stolen Identity Tax Refund Fraud, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-tax-193.html.
34. See IRS Newsroom, IRS Combats Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, IRS
(Jan. 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud-onMany-Fronts-2014.
35. See Sparkman Testimony, supra note 31, at 2:
We cannot manually inspect 100 million refunds to ensure all are correct – nor is there
any justification for doing so. That is neither practical nor in keeping with Congressional
intent. The IRS has a dual mission when it comes to refunds, particularly when they are
generated in whole or in part by tax credits. Refundable and other tax credits are
provided to achieve important policy goals, such as relieving poverty, encouraging work,
or boosting the economy. The IRS must deliver refunds in the intended time frame,
while ensuring that appropriate controls are in place to minimize errors and fraud. We
must balance the need to make payments in a timely manner with the need to ensure that
claims are proper and taxpayer rights are protected.
36. Although fraudulent refund claims clearly warranted sanction, the available remedies
were somewhat limited. Criminal charges were, as they are now, certainly an option, but the scope
of the problem, as well as the relatively small amounts at issue, could overwhelm the U.S.
Department of Justice. For the 2013 fiscal year, the IRS initiated 1,492 identity theft-related
criminal investigations leading to criminal charges in 1,050 cases. See IRS Newsroom, IRS
Criminal Investigation Combats Identity Theft Refund Fraud, IRS (Jan. 2014), http://www.irs.gov/
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Committee Report, existing (pre-section 6676) penalties generally were
based on tax underpayments, not on whether taxpayers made a claim for
refund. 37 Thus, even when the IRS detected that a claim was bogus, the
taxpayer’s costs were generally “limited to repayment of the refund plus
interest for the period of time such funds were held.” 38
One Fraudsters scheme that was mentioned in the lead-up to section
6676’s enactment was the aptly titled 1099-OID tax fraud scheme. The
scheme is relatively simple: so-called taxpayers 39 would create fictitious
Forms 1099-OID (forms used legitimately to report accruing interest for
certain types of debt instruments) claiming that taxes had been withheld
based on the original issue discount (“OID”) that had been included in
their gross income. Those “taxpayers” would then submit fraudulent
returns claiming refunds based on the tax purportedly withheld. 40 To
provide a sense of the breadth of the problem with just the 1099-OID tax
fraud scheme, in one 2012 prosecution, three defendants pleaded guilty
to a nationwide scheme claiming “nearly $100 million in fraudulent
refunds from the IRS.” 41
Another “popular” Fraudster refund scheme is committed by those
in prison. According to TIGTA, “fraudulent tax returns filed by
prisoners and identified by the IRS [have] increased from more than
18,000 tax returns in 2004 to more than 168,000 tax returns in 2010,
with the refunds claimed on these returns increasing from $68 million to
$757 million.” 42 In testimony to Congress, TIGTA estimated that bogus
uac/Newsroom/IRS-Criminal-Investigation-Combats-Identity-Theft-Refund-Fraud.
While
significant, according to TIGTA, “billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent tax refunds continue
to be issued without detection.” See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DETECTION HAS
IMPROVED; HOWEVER, IDENTITY THEFT CONTINUES TO RESULT IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT TAX REFUNDS (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340122fr.pdf.
37. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186 (“Generally, existing penalties are calculated
on the existence of a tax underpayment and not on whether claim results in a refund.”).
38. Id.
39. The word “taxpayers” is a bit of a stretch in this context.
40. See United States v. Sundberg, No. C-09-4085 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93653, at
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011). Under a typical Form 1099-OID refund scheme, . . . a taxpayer
claims to have either issued or purchased a debt instrument that generated OID interest income. The
taxpayer further claims that federal income taxes were withheld by the borrower for the full amount
of the OID interest income purportedly earned by the taxpayer. The taxpayer then reports the total
amount of the false withholding (and sometimes the false OID interest income) on their income tax
return, resulting in a large (and completely unsubstantiated) refund. Id.
41. See Press Release, U.S. Att’ys Office, W. Dist. Mo., Georgia Woman Pleads Guilty to
Tax Fraud: Nearly $100 Million Scheme Is Largest False Claims Case Ever Prosecuted in MO,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/mow/news2012/
wilson_jennifer.ple.html.
42. Press Release, Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., More Improvements Needed to
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refund claims rose the following year (2011) to $3.7 billion. 43
In an effort to slow the growth of prisoner refund fraud, Congress
passed The Inmate Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2008 (the “Inmate Tax
Fraud Prevention Act”), which gave the IRS the authority to disclose
information concerning prisoners who filed a false tax return to the head
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as state departments of
corrections. 44 The law also requires TIGTA to provide Congress with a
report on the IRS’s progress in sharing prisoner tax information. As of
October 2010, TIGTA found that the IRS had not shared any such
information. 45 As recently as January 2014, the situation has not
changed. 46
One impetus for passing section 6676 was to address prison refund
fraud. 47 I leave for others to deduce the logic and efficacy of seeking to
impose a tax penalty on prison refund schemes. Not to put too fine a
point on it, but those already incarcerated are not likely to be dissuaded
from engaging in fraudulent refund schemes based on a potential 20%
penalty. 48
As noted above, refund schemes based on identity theft constitute a
significant portion of Fraudster refund schemes. In 2012, TIGTA
estimated that “the IRS could issue approximately $21 billion in
fraudulent tax refunds resulting from identity theft over the next five
years.” 49 In response, the IRS listed identity theft at the top of its “‘Dirty
Stop Prisoner Tax Fraud, TIGTA Finds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2013-02.htm.
43. See Oversight Hearing – Internal Revenue Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Serv. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 23 (2014) (testimony of the
Hon. J. Russell George, TIGTA), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/
congress_02262014.pdf [hereinafter J. Russell George Testimony] (“The IRS informed us that the
number of fraudulent tax returns identified by the IRS as filed using a prisoner SSN has increased
from more than 18,000 tax returns in CY 2004 to more than 186,000 tax returns in CY 2011. The
refunds claimed on these tax returns increased from $68 million to $3.7 billion.”).
44. Inmate Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-428, 122 Stat. 4839.
45. See J. Russell George Testimony, supra note 43, at 23-24.
46. Id.
47. Prison refund schemes were one of the two “certain refund schemes [that] have
overwhelmed IRS resources” identified in the 2005 TIGTA Report, which was cited as basis for
passing section 6676. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186 (citing 2005 TIGTA REPORT,
supra note 3).
48. See To Examine Tax Fraud Committed by Prison Inmates: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Rep. Tom
Feeney) (noting that “prisoners often engage in this form of criminal activity without concern for
the consequences because they are already incarcerated”).
49. Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., There Are Billions of Dollars in Undetected Tax
Refund Fraud Resulting From Identity Theft 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201242080fr.pdf.
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Dozen’ Tax Scams for 2014” 50 and declared, “[S]topping identity theft
and refund fraud is a top priority.” 51
For reasons that are patent, however, section 6676 will have no
deterrent effect on identity theft schemes. First, the person making the
claim is not the taxpayer, making enforcement problematic. Moreover, if
identity theft is conducted by a criminal enterprise, it would be difficult
to determine who, exactly, should be liable for the penalty. Second,
identity theft is already subject to numerous criminal sanctions. 52 A
potential 20% penalty likely adds little deterrence. Lastly, because much
identity theft originates from abroad, 53 the IRS would have little
opportunity to collect the penalty even if it identified the foreign
perpetrators.
2. Gamers Refund Schemes
In addition to Fraudster refund schemes, the government must also
combat tax avoidance transactions seeking to exploit the tax code, i.e.,
tax shelters. 54 The reason is simple: tax shelters for businesses and high

50. IRS Newsroom, IRS Releases the “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams for 2014; Identity Theft,
Phone Scams Lead List, IRS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Releases-the%E2%80%9CDirty-Dozen%E2%80%9D-Tax-Scams-for-2014;-Identity-Theft,-Phone-Scams-LeadList.
51. See IRS Newsroom, IRS Combats Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, IRS
(Mar. 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraudon-Many-Fronts.
52. Identity theft is often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.§ 1028(a)(7) (2012), which makes it a
crime to “knowingly transfer[], possess[] or use[], without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with,
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under
any applicable State or local law.” This offense, in most circumstances, carries a maximum term of
fifteen years’ imprisonment, a fine, and criminal forfeiture of any personal property used or
intended to be used to commit the offense. Identity theft also may involve violations of other
statutes, such as identification fraud (§ 1028), credit card fraud (§ 1029), computer fraud (§ 1030),
mail fraud (§ 1341), wire fraud (§ 1343), or financial institution fraud (§ 1344). All these statutes
are felonies carrying substantial penalties, in some circumstances as high as thirty years’
imprisonment, fines, and criminal forfeiture.
53. See Gregory Korte, Worldwide Identity Thieves Steal Millions in Tax Refunds, USA
TODAY (Nov. 8, 2013, 9:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/11/07/identitytheft-tax-fraud-lithuania/3466663/.
54. The tax shelters described in this Article are “technical” tax shelters, described by former
Treasury Assistant Secretary Eric Solomon as “tax-engineered transaction[s] normally with little
business purpose except to save taxes with minimal risk or profit potential often designed to create
[a] tax loss without an economic loss or in some cases to make income nontaxable.” See Eric
Solomon, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Address at the Tax Policy Center-Tax Analysts Forum on Tax
Shelters 11 (Feb. 11, 2005) (transcript on file with author); see also Wright, supra note 24, at 61415.
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net worth individuals have cost the U.S. Treasury billions annually. 55
In what some argue was an effort to stem the tide of tax shelters,
Congress in 2010 enacted section 7701(o), codifying the long-standing
economic substance doctrine (“ES Codification”). 56 ES Codification
gave the IRS statutory authority to deny the tax benefits of a transaction
unless “the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and . . . the
taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax
effects) for entering into such transaction.” 57
Economic substance is one of five common law doctrines that can
be applied to deny the tax benefits of a tax shelter (or any other taxmotivated transaction), notwithstanding the fact that the transaction may
have satisfied the literal requirements of specific tax provisions. 58 Before
ES Codification, none of those common law doctrines appeared in the
Code. Instead, empowered with the discretion to determine whether a
transaction’s tax benefits should be denied despite its arguable
adherence to the Code, courts developed the doctrines over the years.59
Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is universally acknowledged

55. See TAX DIVISION: U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 8, available
at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-tax-justification.pdf. See also Wright,
supra note 24, at 613.
56. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a),
124 Stat. 1029, 1067. Others have argued that it was a way to manipulate the budget. ES
Codification was scored to raise $4.5 billion, and supporters of bills that included ES Codification
were “looking for revenue wherever it might be found.” See Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and
Regulatory Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1, 22 (2012). See also Jeremy Coder, The Journey to Codify Economic Substance Is Over,
but Will It Be Worth It?, 127 TAX NOTES 16 (2010) (noting that “many in the tax community have
suspected that codification was pushed in part because of its revenue-raising ability”).
57. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012). That definition of economic substance evolved from a long
line of federal tax cases, including Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2006), vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004); ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d
Cir. 1998), aff’g 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 189 (1997); and Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007), aff’d 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). On at least three
occasions, the U.S. Tax Court has noted that section 7701(o) represents Congress’ adoption of the
economic substance as articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of
ACM Partnership. See, e.g., Crispin v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349, at *16 n.14 (2012); Blum
v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1099, at *17 n.21 (2012); Rovakat, LLC v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M.
(CCH) 264, at *27 n.11 (2011).
58. The others are substance over form, step transaction, sham transaction, and business
purpose. See Yoram Keinan, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508 Tax Mgmt. Port. (BNA) A-58
(2007) for a thorough discussion of the doctrines. See also Patricia Lampreave, An Assessment of
Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines in the United States and the European Union, BULL. INT’L TAX’N,
Mar. 2012, at 153.
59. See Lawrence Zelenak, Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 44 S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 183
(2001).
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that substantial overlap existed, and still exists, among the doctrines, and
the lines between one doctrine and others are often blurred. 60
ES Codification gave the IRS additional weapons to combat
shelters: new strict liability penalties for transactions lacking economic
substance. 61 One such penalty was a new 20% (increased to 40% under
certain circumstances) 62 strict liability penalty for any “transaction
lacking economic substance . . . or failing to meet the requirements of
any similar rule of law.” 63 In addition to the new penalty, Congress also
made taxpayers strictly liable for penalties related to transactions lacking
economic substance by eliminating the reasonable cause defense.64 The
new strict liability penalty was intended to change the calculus for
Gamers by making the potential cost of engaging in tax avoidance
transactions greater. 65
One issue left unresolved in ES Codification was in what
circumstances the codified economic substance, as opposed to one or
more of the other four common law doctrines, would apply. 66 Even if it
60. The overlap among the doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article. However, examples
can be found in certain substance-over-form cases in which courts have examined (i) whether the
substance of the transaction comported with its form, (ii) whether the transaction had economic
substance, and (iii) whether the transaction had a legitimate business purpose. See STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL: PART THREE 98 n.300 (Comm. Print 2009)
[hereinafter 2009 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION]; BB&T Corp. v. United States, 1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) P50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008). Although the Second Circuit
found for the government in TIFD III–E, Inc. v. United States, on remand to consider issues under
section 704(e), the district court found for the taxpayer. See TIFD III–E Inc. v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009). See also Yoram Keinan, Rethinking The Role of the Judicial Step
Transaction Principle and a Proposal For Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45 (2007).
61. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6), which applies the accuracy-related penalty of section 6662 to the
portion of any underpayments attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance. Congress
also (1) amended section 6664(c), eliminating the reasonable cause exception for underpayments to
any portion of any underpayment attributable to a section 6662(b)(6) transaction; and (2) amended
section 6664(d) so that the reasonable cause exception found in section 6664(d)(1) shall not apply to
any reportable transaction understatement (within the meaning of section 6662A(b)) attributable to a
section 6662(b)(6) transaction. Id. § 6664(c)-(d).
62. See id. § 6662(h)-(i).
63. Id. § 6662(b)(6).
64. See supra note 61.
65. While that may have been the intent, I have argued that codification had little actual effect
on changing Gamers’ behavior, because even with the added costs, the benefits will outweigh the
costs for most taxpayers. See Wright, supra note 24, at 654.
66. No official legislative history exists for section 7701(o). However, the 2009 Technical
Explanation was introduced contemporaneously with the introduction of the law. Although not
considered formal “legislative history,” it does provide insight into section 7701(o). A detailed
review of the economic substance doctrine and the proposals to codify it are found in 2009
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION: PART TWO, supra note 60, at 34-71 and STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
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is clear that a tax avoidance transaction’s tax benefits should be denied,
substantial uncertainty exists regarding whether the reason for denial is a
lack of economic substance (which generates harsher penalties) or one of
the other four common law doctrines. 67 Some commentators have noted
that by failing to provide rules for when the economic substance doctrine
would apply, Congress left a gap that prevented the IRS from using ES
Codification to aggressively combat all but the most egregious tax
shelters. 68
As part of ES Codification, Congress also added section 6676(c),
extending the 20% strict liability penalty to refund claims based on
transactions lacking economic substance. 69 Congress also eliminated the
reasonable basis defense to the section 6676 penalty for transactions
determined to be devoid of economic substance. 70
It is unclear why Congress added an economic substance penalty to
section 6676. In the 2010 Joint Committee Technical Explanation,
fifteen pages are devoted to explaining ES Codification, but the only
detail about the section 6676(c) penalty is the following sentence:
Similarly, a claim for refund or credit that is excessive under section
6676 due to a claim that is lacking in economic substance or failing to
meet the requirements of any similar rule of law is subject to the 20
percent penalty under that section, and the reasonable basis exception
71
is not available.

A Lexis search of the terms “economic substance” and “6676”
returned no cases in which the IRS has asserted the penalty. 72 No other
“RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE “PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 142-56 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter 2010
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION].
67. That uncertainty gives the IRS wide discretion to apply one or more of those judicial
doctrines to a certain transaction. The IRS has chosen to exercise that discretion cautiously and has
provided that, “until further guidance is issued, the related penalty provisions are limited to the
application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be imposed due to the application of
any other ‘similar rule of law’ or judicial doctrine, e.g., step transaction doctrine, substance over
form, or sham transaction.” See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2012-008 (Apr. 3, 2012).
68. Bryan C. Skarlatos, Penalties: Unintended Consequences of the Economic Substance
Penalty, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Oct.-Nov. 2012, at 21, 21, available at
http://kflaw.com/siteFiles/News/39E7E7D53F3FEF97D5B42E3EB3A9B034.pdf; Carol P. Tello,
Dealing with Codified Economic Substance in the Context of International Issues: Self Help, the
Only Game in Town, TAX EXECUTIVES INST., Spring 2011, at 43, 44, available at
http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Pages/TTE_SPRING11_dealing_with_codified_economic_substan
ce_in_the_context_of_international_issues.aspx.
69. See I.R.C. § 6676(c) (2012).
70. See id.
71. See 2010 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 66, at 156.
72. The only case where the terms are mentioned together, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States,
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information suggests the IRS has levied the penalty in other
circumstances. 73
The likely reason there is no evidence of the IRS’s use of the
economic substance penalty under section 6676(c) is that Gamers enter
into tax shelters and other tax avoidance transactions not to generate
false refunds, but to avoid paying taxes. 74 As was the case with prisoner
refund schemes, the deterrent effect of section 6676(c) on Gamers is
dubious at best.
B.

Erroneous Refunds – The Strivers
“My power is discombobulatingly devastating . . . It’s ludicrous these
mortals even attempt to enter my realm.”
–Mike Tyson

75

If we eliminate the refund schemes of Fraudsters and Gamers, the
only thing left covered by section 6676 is the erroneous refunds based on
mistakes of law or fact, or aggressive, but not fraudulent, return
positions. That means the Strivers (other than those improperly claiming
the EITC, which is exempt from section 6676), 76 are the only group that
will bear the brunt of the section 6676 penalty, because, as explained
above, the penalty cannot reach most Fraudsters and Gamers. However,
unlike almost every other tax penalty, section 6676 contains no
reasonable cause defense; therefore, the Strivers have only a limited
ability to escape the penalty. In other words, the penalty that Congress
enacted to cover Fraudsters and Gamers covers neither group well, but
did have the effect of creating a new, hard-to-escape penalty for Strivers
– the very group it would like to help. As Iron Mike Tyson would say
refers to section 6676 only to evaluate the IRS’s position on the reasonable basis standard, as
articulated by an IRS Chief Counsel Memorandum that looked to section 6662 for guidance in
determining reasonable basis. See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D. Conn.
2014).
73. In an admittedly ad hoc effort to determine whether the IRS sought to enforce any such
penalties, I reached out to attorneys at my old firms, Skadden Arps and Steptoe. None mentioned
being aware of any attempt by the IRS to impose the section 6676(c) penalty.
74. See Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive
Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 103 (2010) (“Tax shelters are extraordinarily complex and
highly aggressive (though usually not patently illegal) transactions designed entirely for the purpose
of reducing, and in some cases eliminating, the tax liabilities of large corporate or wealthy
individual taxpayers.”).
75. See Brian Opal, Mike Tyson: Top 25 Quotes, FIGHT SAGA (Nov. 27, 2014, 1:13 PM),
http://www.fightsaga.com/news/item/4980-Mike-Tyson-Top-25-quotes.
76. Section 6676 specifically exempts taxpayers erroneously claiming the EITC from the
penalty. See I.R.C. § 6676(a) (2012).
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(and has said, see above quote), this is “ludicrous.”
Before delving into the myriad legal and administrative problems
associated with section 6676, an overview of the existing penalty
structure, as well as how section 6676 fits into that structure, is
necessary to put the issues in context. For readers already familiar with
the current tax penalty structure, as well as the available defenses and
procedures for challenging those penalties, please skim this section and
move to Part III.
C.

Current Law
1. Penalties

Section 6676, as noted above, has no specific legislative history.
The first legislative attempt to address the problem of erroneous refund
claims can be found in a 2006 Senate Finance Committee draft, which
proposed a 20% penalty for erroneous refund claims. 77 Although that
2006 draft was not enacted, Congress eventually passed the erroneous
refund penalty as part of the 2007 Act. The Joint Committee
acknowledged that a major impetus for Congress in passing section 6676
was the 2005 TIGTA Report, noted above, which highlighted the
problems experienced by the IRS in dealing with erroneous or bogus
refund claims. 78
The law is relatively short. Section 6676 in its entirety reads:
(a) Civil penalty. If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income
tax (other than a claim for a refund or credit relating to the earned
income credit under section 32) is made for an excessive amount,
unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a
reasonable basis, the person making such claim shall be liable for a
77. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX REPEAL AND TAXPAYER PROTECTION
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2006, S. REP. NO. 109-336 (2006). Explaining the provision, the
Committee noted:
The filing of erroneous refund claims is being used by some taxpayers to put a strain on
IRS resources and to delay the resolution of tax matters. The Committee believes a
meaningful penalty on a refund claim with no reasonable basis for the claimed treatment
will deter the use of such claims for the purpose of impeding effective tax
administration.
Id. at 66.
78. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4 (citing 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 186);
see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STATISTICAL PORTRAYAL OF THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION FUNCTION’S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FROM FISCAL YEAR 2000 THROUGH
FISCAL YEAR 2006 10 (2007) (showing that tax refund fraud increased 36.2% between 2003 and
2005).

AND
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penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount.
(b) Excessive amount. For purposes of this section, the term “excessive
amount” means in the case of any person the amount by which the
amount of the claim for refund or credit for any taxable year exceeds
the amount of such claim allowable under this title for such taxable
year.
(c) Noneconomic substance transactions treated as lacking reasonable
basis. For purposes of this section, any excessive amount which is
attributable to any transaction described in section 6662(b)(6) shall not
be treated as having a reasonable basis.
(d) Coordination with other penalties. This section shall not apply to
any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit
which is subject to a penalty imposed under part II of subchapter A of
79
chapter 68.

Unlike penalty provisions based on a taxpayer’s underpayment of a
tax liability, section 6676 penalizes mere claims for erroneous refunds or
credits. The ability to penalize claims specifically was noted by the Joint
Committee, which found that because existing penalties were based on
tax underpayments and not the amount of a refund claim, there was
“very little expected cost to the taxpayer who files an erroneous refund
claim under present law.” 80
The “existing penalties” referenced by the Joint Committee
included the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty , enacted in 1989 to
replace a number of separate penalties.81 That section 6662 penalty
imposes a 20% penalty on underpayments of tax attributable to, inter
alia, “negligence or disregard of rules or regulation.” 82 In general, the
accuracy-related penalty can be avoided upon a showing of reasonable
cause. 83 The term “underpayment,” defined in section 6664 and its
implementing regulations, seeks to capture the difference between the
79. I.R.C. § 6676(d).
80. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
81. See Improved Penalty Administrative Compliance Tax Act (“IMPACT”), P.L.101-239,
tit. VII, subtit. G of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.
82. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). The section 6662 penalty applies to the portion of any underpayment
that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any
substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5)
any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. The penalty for underpayments
attributable to these failures is generally 20% of the underpayment, but in the case of a gross
valuation misstatement, it is 40%. The section 6662 and 6676 penalties do not overlap, as section
6676(d) prohibits the IRS from imposing the section 6676 penalty to any portion of a refund claim
subject to, inter alia, a section 6662 underpayment.
83. See id. § 6664(c)(1).
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tax paid and the tax that should have been paid. 84
Section 6676(c), added in 2010 as part of ES Codification, applies
to claims for refunds based on transactions lacking economic substance
or, pursuant to section 7701(o), “failing to meet the requirements of any
similar rule of law.” 85 With respect to the “any similar rule of law”
clause, the Joint Committee noted that it was intended to apply to “a
transaction the tax benefits of which are disallowed as a result of the
application of the similar factors and analysis that is required under the
provision for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is
used to describe the doctrine.” 86 The IRS has stated that it will not seek
to utilize the “any similar rule of law” provision in applying the section
6676 penalties. 87
2. Penalty Defense
As a way to protect taxpayers, Congress gave taxpayers the right to
challenge section 6662 penalties prior to assessment. 88 In addition,
notice and demand for payment (“notice and demand”), often the start of
the IRS’s collection procedures, in most cases cannot be initiated prior to
assessment. 89
Generally, before assessing a section 6662 penalty, the IRS must
first send to the taxpayer a legally valid notice of deficiency, and that
notice of deficiency is a prerequisite for collection under the IRS’s
84. See id. § 6664(a), which defines “underpayment” as “the amount by which any tax
imposed by this title exceeds the excess of—
(1) the sum of—
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.
85. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 381 (Comm. Print 2011). Under section 7701(o), a
transaction is treated as having economic substance only if it passes a conjunctive, two-prong test.
The test requires that (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from federal income tax
effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from
federal income tax effects) for entering into the transaction. I.R.C. § 7701(o).
86. 2010 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 66, at 155 n.359.
87. I.R.S. Guidance LB&I-4-0711-015 (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-and-Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-SubstanceDoctrine-and-Related-Penalties. In the Guidance, the IRS stated that the penalties provided in
section 6676 “are limited to the application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be
imposed due to the application of any other ‘similar rule of law’ or judicial doctrine (e.g., step
transaction doctrine, substance over form or sham transaction).” Id.
88. “Assessment” is the formal recording of a tax liability by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6203.
89. If collection of the tax is in jeopardy, the IRS is not required to wait ten days after giving
the taxpayer notice and demand or thirty days after giving notice of intent to levy and notice of a
right to a CDP hearing. See IRM 5.17.15.4.2 (Oct. 23, 2014).
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collection procedures. 90 Once a taxpayer receives a notice of deficiency,
the taxpayer can appeal the penalty with the IRS, or, after the IRS issues
a notice of deficiency, challenge the penalty assessment in the U.S. Tax
Court (“Tax Court”), the only pre-payment forum for taxpayers seeking
to challenge an IRS tax or penalty assessment. 91
The procedures for challenging notices of deficiency are outlined in
sections 6211–6213, and are commonly referred to as deficiency
procedures (“Deficiency Procedures”). 92 Most tax cases are litigated in
Tax Court, primarily because it permits taxpayers to challenge
deficiencies prior to payment. 93
Unlike section 6662 penalties, taxpayers have no right to challenge
section 6676 penalties prior to assessment because section 6676 does not
permit Deficiency Procedures.94 Pursuant to Section 6671(a), the IRS
can impose section 6676 penalties by notice and demand, without the
issuance of a notice of deficiency. 95 As such, section 6676 penalties are
immediately assessable and may be imposed at whatever point the IRS
deems them applicable.
As an immediately assessable penalty, a taxpayer has no explicit
right to challenge the section 6676 penalty assessment before its
imposition. Whether the IRS will countenance a pre-assessment right to
challenge the section 6676 penalty, however, is far from clear. Internal
IRS guidance suggests section “[section] 6676 cases are generally
subject to pre-assessment and appeal rights procedures.” 96 Unfortunately
for taxpayers, internal IRS guidance is not binding on the IRS and may
not be relied on by taxpayers. 97
The only legally prescribed methods for taxpayers seeking to
challenge section 6676 penalties are to either (i) pre-pay the penalty and
sue for refund in either a U.S. District Court or the Court of Federal
Claims (“Refund Procedures”), 98 or (ii) request a Collection Due Process
90. See id. 5.17.15.4.1.
91. See I.R.C. §§ 6212-6213.
92. See id. §§ 6211-6216, found in I.R.C. Chapter 63, Subchapter B–Deficiency Procedures in
the Case of Income, Estate, Gift, and Certain Excise Taxes.
93. See Danshera Cords, Tax Court Appointments and Reappointments: Improving the
Process, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 501, 533 (Jan. 2012) (“Due to a number of factors, including that the
taxpayer need not prepay the tax prior to filing a petition in the Tax Court, the majority of tax cases
are filed in the Tax Court.”).
94. I.R.C. § 6676 is located in I.R.C. Chapter 68, Subchapter B–Assessable Penalties.
95. See id. § 6671(a).
96. See IRM 8.11.1.2.7(4) (Oct. 16, 2014).
97. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 50209 (2013).
98. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2012), district courts and the Court of Federal Claims
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(“CDP”) hearing after the IRS initiates collection procedures.99 If the
taxpayer and the IRS cannot resolve the issue in a CDP hearing, the
taxpayer may seek resolution with the Tax Court, which gives taxpayers
the ability to challenge not only the IRS’s collection procedures, but also
the underlying liability (“CDP Procedures”). 100
3. Exceptions to Penalties
Taxpayers can challenge the imposition of section 6662 penalties if
they can show they acted with “reasonable cause . . . and . . . in good
faith” (“reasonable cause”). 101 The reasonable cause defense excuses
from penalties taxpayers who can show an “honest misunderstanding of
fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and
circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of
the taxpayer.” 102
For reasons that are not entirely clear, taxpayers seeking to
challenge section 6676 penalties may not raise the reasonable cause
defense. 103 As part of the 2007 JCT Report, the Joint Committee
contemplated a reasonable cause exception to the then-proposed section
6676 penalty, noting that the penalty would apply absent a reasonable
basis or if “the taxpayer did not have reasonable cause.” 104 However, the
reasonable cause defense was excluded from the final bill, leaving only
the “reasonable basis” exception discussed below, which has an entirely
different meaning than reasonable cause.105
Absent a reasonable cause defense, section 6676 applies to
erroneous refund claims lacking a “reasonable basis in law.” 106 Section

have original jurisdiction over:
Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
99. See I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3)(B).
100. Id. § 6330(d)(1). See also Callahan v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 44 (2008) (holding the Tax
Court had jurisdiction under section 6330(d) to hear return penalty cases).
101. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). Section 6664 does not define reasonable cause. However, Treasury
Regulations provide that “the determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and
in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and
circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). See also William A. Drennan,
Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).
103. Section 6676 permits only the reasonable basis defense. See I.R.C. § 6676(a).
104. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
105. Work Opportunity Tax Act, supra note 6.
106. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186.
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6676 does not define the term “reasonable basis,” and, to date, no
regulations have been issued articulating a definition in the context of
the section 6676 penalty. 107 Nevertheless, the IRS appears to have
adopted the definition found in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3),
which defines the term as follows:
Reasonable basis is a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is,
significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper. The
reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is
merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. If a return position
is reasonably based on one or [more] of the authorities set forth in
[Treas. Reg.] § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (taking into account the relevance
and persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments),
the return position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard
even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard as
108
defined in [Treas. Reg.] § 1.6662-4(d)(2).

That reasonable basis definition eliminates penalties only for
transactions with one or more valid legal, as opposed to factual,
justifications. Thus, unlike the reasonable cause defense available under
section 6662, taxpayers cannot rely on good faith legal or factual errors
to escape section 6676 penalties.
A question left unanswered is how the IRS will determine whether
a refund claim has a reasonable basis. Neither Treasury nor the IRS has
articulated procedures for determining whether a reasonable basis exists
in the context of the section 6676 penalty. 109 In fact, the IRS has issued
conflicting guidance surrounding the determination of “reasonable
basis,” leaving taxpayers and practitioners in the dark, and potentially
exacerbating the First Amendment issues discussed infra.
In 2013, the IRS appeared to indicate, following a TIGTA inquiry,
that it will make the reasonable basis determination without taxpayer
input. Specifically, the IRS asserted that, “the determination of
reasonable basis is a judgmental decision based on a review of the
position taken on the return and all applicable supporting authorities for
the position.” 110 That language does not appear to suggest taxpayers will

107. See I.R.S.Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-152570-09 (Feb. 26, 2010) (“While section 6676
does not define ‘reasonable basis’ and there are no regulations in effect under that statute, we look
to the definition of ‘reasonable basis’ in regulations promulgated under the section 6662 accuracyrelated penalty for guidance.”).
108. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003)).
109. See, e.g., Jeremy Coder, Waiting for Direction on Refund Penalties, TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 2, 2012, at 127-3.
110. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 15.
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be given an opportunity to present arguments for reasonable basis.
However, conflicting advice to IRS employees is provided in two
2010 Chief Counsel Memoranda. 111 In both, IRS Counsel states that
taxpayers will be given the opportunity to show reasonable basis.
Specifically, both memoranda state that the section 6676 penalty will
apply unless taxpayers “can show” that their claim has a reasonable
basis. 112 Use of the word “can” suggests taxpayers will have an
opportunity to demonstrate their reasonable basis to the IRS and avoid
the penalty.
III. UNMET POTENTIAL
Before section 6676’s enactment, a taxpayer filing an erroneous
claim for refund faced three circumstances (ignoring potential criminal
or fraud allegations): 113
(1) the IRS denies the claim—no penalty;
(2) the IRS wrongly accepts the claim, issues a refund check, but
timely realizes the error—potential penalty; or
(3) the IRS wrongly accepts the claim, issues a refund check, and fails
to timely realize the error—no penalty.

Only in the second circumstance were penalties potentially
applicable. In that case, the applicable section 6662 penalty would be
based on the “underpayment” of tax, defined in section 6664 and its
implementing regulations to capture the difference between what was
paid and what should have been paid. 114 With respect to the erroneously111. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-152570-09 (Feb. 26, 2010) and I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Mem. POSTN-125498-10 (Aug. 27, 2010).
112. See sources cited supra note 111 (emphasis added).
113. Criminal tax crimes and tax fraud are exceedingly difficult for the government to prove.
For tax crimes, the government must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the taxpayer
acted willfully. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 193 (1991); United States v.
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1973); Sansone
v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 124, 139
(1954). For civil tax fraud, the IRS must demonstrate “clear and convincing evidence to prove that
some part of the underpayment of tax was due to fraud.” See IRM 25.1.6.1 (Nov. 5, 2014). For an
interesting look at what does (and does not) constitute fraud, see Brown v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M.
(CCH) 630 (2013).
114. See I.R.C. § 6664(a) (2012). “Underpayment is defined in I.R.C. § 6664 and the
implementing regulation expresses the definition of this term by the following formula:
Underpayment = W - (X + Y - Z), where W= the amount of income tax imposed, X = the amount
shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return; Y = the amounts not so shown previously assessed
(or collected without assessment), and Z = the amount of rebates made. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a).”
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-119273-12 (May 30, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/
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issued refund, the IRS often ignored it in its underpayment calculation,
and simply required taxpayers to repay the erroneous refund claim with
interest. 115
Section 6676 gives the IRS the ability to penalize taxpayers in the
first circumstance, and a greater opportunity to penalize them in the
second. In both cases, the penalty calculation appears straightforward:
20% of the erroneous refund claim. However, as discussed infra,
calculation of that penalty has raised significant definitional issues that
have thrust the IRS into a procedural nightmare.
A.

Problems Since Enactment
1. Internal IRS Issues

In 2008, the IRS completed a study on “how best to implement the
erroneous refund penalty” and estimated that “establishing and
maintaining an erroneous refund penalty unit would cost at least $3.4
million per year and could result in the assessment of $101 million in
penalties each year.” 116 As of 2013, the IRS had taken no steps toward
implementing its own recommendations. 117
To make matters worse, in 2009 and 2010, the IRS made incorrect
legal determinations regarding when it could assess the section 6676
penalty. A memorandum issued by IRS Counsel on November 20, 2009
(“2009 IRS Counsel Memorandum”) concluded incorrectly that if the
IRS disallowed refundable tax credits and did not issued a refund based
on those disallowed credits (a “frozen refund”), the frozen refund
amount nevertheless should be included in the section 6662 penalty
calculation. 118 In other words, if the IRS denied a taxpayer’s refund
claim based on refundable credits and froze (i.e., did not issue) a refund,
the IRS came to the absurd conclusion that it should penalize the

pub/lanoa/pmta_2012-16.pdf.
115. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186:
Generally, existing penalties are calculated on the existence of a tax underpayment and
not on whether claim results in a refund. Even in the case where an erroneous refund
claim is detected, the taxpayer’s costs may be limited to repayment of the refund plus
interest for the period of time such funds were held. Thus, there is very little expected
cost to the taxpayer who files an erroneous refund claim under present law.
116. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
117. See id.
118. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-128277-09 (Nov. 20, 2009), exs. 1, 2, and 6, available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2010-01.pdf (showing a pre-refund example in which a
taxpayer’s section 6662 penalty calculation was determined based on an improperly claimed, but
unpaid, refundable tax credit).
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taxpayer under section 6662 as if it had actually issued the refund, and
the frozen refund amount should be included in the section 6662
underpayment calculation. In a 2010 IRS counsel memorandum (the
“2010 IRS Counsel Memorandum”), the IRS again made the same
incorrect determination. 119
Those 2009 and 2010 IRS Counsel Memoranda (the “2009 & 2010
IRS Memos”) authorized IRS examiners to seek section 6662 penalties
in the precise situation section 6676 was enacted to address, i.e.,
erroneous claims for refund. Moreover, because section 6676(d)
prohibits the imposition of section 6676 penalties if “any portion of the
excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a
penalty imposed under” inter alia, section 6662, the 2009 & 2010
Memos prohibited proper application of section 6676. 120
The 2009 & 2010 Memos were flat wrong. The IRS acknowledged
as much in a May 12, 2012, IRS Counsel Memorandum (the “2012 IRS
Counsel Memorandum”), which determined correctly that a frozen
refund could not constitute part the section 6662 underpayment
calculation. 121
Relying on the 2009 & 2010 Memos prevented the IRS from
assessing the erroneous refund penalty in numerous cases. 122 As a way to
explain its errors, the IRS placed the blame on unclear Treasury
Regulations, a startling result for the agency charged with enforcing the
tax laws and working with Treasury to draft tax regulations. 123
What the IRS did after the 2012 IRS Counsel is more troubling,
however. After determining the 2009 & 2010 Memos were wrong in
2012, the IRS blithely continued to impose section 6662 penalties on
frozen refund claims for roughly ten months. 124 Moreover, despite

119. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-125498-10 (Aug. 27, 2010), ex. 2, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta-2011-003.pdf (including the unpaid refund amount in the
underpayment calculation).
120. See I.R.C. § 6676(d) (2012).
121. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-119273-12 (May 30, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2012-16.pdf. See also 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
122. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
123. See id. (“The IRS indicated that the incorrect interpretation contained in the November
2009 memorandum occurred because a Treasury Regulation that provided guidance on this subject
was not clear.”).
124. See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 184 (2013),
available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/ACCURACYRELATED-PENALTIES-The-IRS-Assessed-Penalties-Improperly,-Refused-to-Abate-Them,-andStill-Assesses-Penalties-Automatically.pdf (“The IRS continued imposing substantial
understatement penalties on frozen refund claims for about ten months after receiving the May 30,
2012 guidance.”).
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acknowledging it was wrong, the IRS did not give taxpayers hit with the
improper penalties a break, and “failed to remove over 46,000 penalties
totaling more than $40 million that it imposed in the two and a half years
between the issuance of the first [IRS] Counsel opinion (November 20,
2009) (which [IRS] Counsel has implicitly acknowledged was incorrect)
and the most recent [IRS] Counsel opinion (May 30, 2012).” 125 In a
stunning rebuke to the IRS on this issue, TIGTA wrote that the “IRS’s
failure to expend the resources needed to remove these improper and
inapplicable penalties signals disrespect for the law and a disregard for
taxpayer rights.” 126
As was the case with the erroneous application of the section 6662
penalty, the IRS may not be exercising the diligence required with
respect to section 6676. In 2009, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) reported that it had become “aware of
section 6676 penalties being imposed automatically and regularly when
a claim for refund is denied, without any consideration of whether the
position has a reasonable basis.” 127 The AICPA suggested that the IRS’s
actions were possibly “attributable to the fact that to date the IRS has not
published regulations or other guidance with respect to section 6676.” 128
2. Fresh Gas on the Fire
As if refund penalties were not complicated enough to administer,
the Tax Court made the IRS’s job even more difficult in November
2013. In Rand v. Commissioner (“Rand”), a divided Tax Court
concluded that the IRS was wrong in how it calculated underpayments
based on certain refundable tax credits. 129
Before discussing the Rand case, a bit of background is necessary.
In order to calculate the amount of a section 6662 penalty, the first step
is to determine the “underpayment.” The penalty is generally 20% of the
underpayment. 130 For penalty purposes, underpayment means:
the amount by which any tax imposed by this title exceeds the
excess of—
(1) the sum of—
125. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 10.
126. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 124, at 182.
127. PENALTY REFORM TASK FORCE, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT
ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 18 (2009).
128. Id.
129. Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376 (2013).
130. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2012). The penalty can be increased to 40% in certain circumstances.
See id. § 6662(h).
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(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without
assessment), over
(2) the amount of rebates made.

131

Treasury regulations set forth the underpayment calculation in the
following formula:
Underpayment = W– (X+Y– Z) where:
W = the correct amount of tax required to be shown on the return;
X = the tax reported (actually shown) on the return;
Y = the amount not shown, but previously assessed (or collected
without assessment); and
Z = certain rebates.

132

Since the Section 6662 penalty was created in 1989, one issue that
sometimes arose was how refundable tax credits fit into the
underpayment calculation. In 1991, Treasury adopted regulations that
stated explicitly that withholding credits under sections 31 and 33
(“refundable withholding credits”) be included in the underpayment
calculation. 133 However, the 1991 regulations failed to address how
refundable non-withholding tax credits, such as the Additional Child Tax
Credit (“ACTC”) codified in section 24, the First-Time Homebuyer Tax
Credit (“FTHBC”) codified in section 36 or the EITC codified in section
32 (collectively, “refundable non-withholding credits”), should be
treated. 134
Before Rand, erroneously-claimed refundable tax credits were
included as a negative number in the “tax reported (actually shown) on
the return,” i.e., the “X” above. As a negative amount included in “X”
above, including the erroneously-claimed refund increased the
underpayment. Although the regulations do not address the treatment,
for underpayment purposes, of those refundable non-withholding credits,
the IRS’s position was that refunds based on refundable non-withholding
131. For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “rebate” means so much of an abatement, credit,
refund, or other repayment as was made on the ground that the tax imposed was less than the excess
of the amount specified in paragraph (1) over the rebates previously made. Id. § 6664(a).
132. Id. § 6664(a)(1)-(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a)(1)-(2) (as amended in 2007). See also
Snow v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 238, 241 (2013).
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(b)(1), (2), and (3); see also id. § 1.6664-2(g), ex. (3); Feller v.
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 497, 509 (2010).
134. See T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374.
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credits should be included in the underpayment calculation in the same
manner as refundable withholding credits. 135 In Rand, the Tax Court told
the IRS the section 6662 penalty calculation was not that simple. 136
B.

The Rand Case

The facts of Rand are straightforward: the taxpayers had a tax
liability of $144 and claimed a total of $7,471 of refundable nonwithholding tax credits, including the ACTC and the EITC. 137 After
applying the refundable credits, the taxpayers claimed, and the IRS
issued them, a refund of $7,327 ($7,471 in tax credits - $144 in tax
liability). The IRS and the taxpayer later agreed that the taxpayers were
not entitled to claim the refundable credits, but disagreed on the amount
of the underpayment.
The IRS sought to include the $7,327 erroneously-claimed refund,
based on the ACTC and EITC refundable credits, in its underpayment
calculation. The taxpayers, on the other hand, argued that refundable
credits should be excluded, or alternatively, that any underpayment be
limited to their original $144 tax liability. The Tax Court disagreed with
the taxpayers’ primary argument, 138 but agreed with the alternative
argument, finding that the underpayment in the case was $144, and the
section 6662 penalty was $29 (20% of $144). 139
135. See Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376, 382 (2013).
136. In one of the first cases to cite Rand, the Tax Court held that the IRS could not impose
section 6662 penalties based on erroneously-claimed first-time homebuyer credits. Li v. Comm’r,
No. 117-12S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2013-97, at *4 (2013) (citing Rand, 141 T.C. at 384) (“We have
recently held that refundable credits such as the first-time homebuyer credit are taken into account
in calculating ‘the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return’ under section
6664(a)(1)(A), but may not reduce the amount shown on the return below zero.”). See also
Richardson v. Comm’r, No. 4280-12S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2014-9, at *8 (2014). Both the Li and
Richardson cases are Tax Court Small tax cases (each an “S-case”) and, pursuant to section
7463(b), are nonreviewable.
137. See Rand, 141 T.C. at 382.
138. The Tax Court reasoned:
Because the Code specifies that certain credits should be disregarded when determining
the tax shown on the return, we can infer that other credits should not be disregarded.
Under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if a statute provides specific
exceptions to a general rule, we may infer that Congress intended to exclude any further
exceptions. . . . This is not a rigid rule and will not apply if the result “is contrary to all
other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United States,
501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) . . . . In this instance we see no evidence of a contrary
congressional intent.
Id. at 387 (citations omitted).
139. The Tax Court relied on the fact that another penalty provision, section 6694, explicitly
discusses understatements to include refundable credits. The court noted that “Congress could have
similarly taken such credits into account under the definition of an underpayment under section
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In Rand, both the IRS and the taxpayers agreed on three elements
of the underpayment calculation: the “W” was $144, and both the “Y”
and “Z” were zero. They disagreed about the “X.” The IRS argued that
the “X” was -$7,327, making the underpayment $7,471 (equal to $144 (-$7,327)). The taxpayers argued that there was no “statutory or
regulatory basis for reducing” the “X” below zero, thereby capping the
underpayment at $144.
In its decision, the court sided with the taxpayer. The court
explained that prior to 1989, “‘underpayment’ was defined with an
explicit cross-reference to the definition of a deficiency” in section
6211. 140 The court then stated that even though that cross-reference was
removed in 1989, section 6211 would nevertheless “assist us in
interpreting” the issues in the case. 141 Looking to section 6211 for
guidance, the court noted section 6211(b)(4) authorizes the IRS to treat
“any excess of the refundable credits claimed as compared to the amount
to which the taxpayer was entitled is treated as a negative tax” for
deficiency purposes. However, applying the canon expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, 142 the court found that because section 6664 does not
contain similar language (and Treasury has not addressed the issue in
regulations), refundable non-withholding credits “would not be
considered a negative tax.”
As a result, the “X” in the underpayment calculation could not be
negative based on refundable non-withholding credits. Thus, Rand’s
penalty would not be influenced by the erroneously-claimed ACTC and
EITC refundable credits (i.e., the “X” would be zero).
The IRS argued to the Rand court that if its position (i.e., that
refundable non-withholding credits be included in the underpayment
calculation) were not accepted, it would lead to “a gap in the penalty
regime,” leaving the IRS no means to penalize excess refundable
credits. 143 The court dismissed that argument, noting: “to the extent an
erroneously claimed credit reduces a tax liability, it may be subject to an
6664(a), but it did not.” Id. at 392.
140. Id. at 386.
141. In its decision, the court noted “the historical link between the definitions of a deficiency
and an underpayment” but found that Congress had broken that link when in “1988 Congress
amended section 6211(b)(4) to specifically provide that certain refundable credits could be taken
into account as negative amounts of tax.” Id. at 391 (citing Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1015(r)(2), 102 Stat. 3342, 3572).
142. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius” as “[w]hen certain . . . things are specified in a law, . . . an intention to exclude all others
from its operation may be inferred”). See also Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 195 (1931).
143. Rand, 141 T.C. at 394.
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accuracy-related penalty under section 6662; to the extent that credit
generates a refund, it may be subject to a penalty under section 6676.” 144
The IRS and Treasury response to Rand is not yet clear. On July 31,
2014, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued a notice ordering IRS
attorneys to concede the Rand issue in Tax Court cases, i.e., to “not treat
claims for refund or credit based on erroneous refundable credits as a
negative amount of tax shown on the return when determining the
amount of an underpayment subject to penalty under section 6662 or
6663.” 145 It is unclear whether the IRS will seek to pursue the section
6676 penalty in those cases, because section 6676 is not subject to
Deficiency Procedures, thus not directly subject to Tax Court litigation.
As Rand is now, absent IRS or Treasury changes, the law of the
land, the court’s holding mandates that if the IRS wanted to penalize
both the underpayment of tax ($144) and the erroneously-claimed refund
($7,327), it would have to do the following:
• impose a section 6662 penalty on the $144 underpayment;
• impose a section 6676 penalty for the portion of the refund
not related to the EITC, because section 6676(a) bars
application of the penalty to EITC-related refund claims;
and
• impose a non-monetary section 32(k) penalty on the
erroneously-claimed EITC. 146 Section 32(k) permits the
government to ban a taxpayer from claiming the EITC for
either two years if she recklessly or intentionally disregards
the EITC rules, or 10 years if she fraudulently claimed the
EITC. 147
If the IRS sought to assess all three penalties at the same time, the
procedural aspects would be cumbersome. The section 6662 penalty
would be assessed through Deficiency Procedures. Thus, the taxpayer
could challenge the section 6662 penalty in the Tax Court.
It is unclear how, in practice, the section 32(k) penalty could be
challenged. While section 32 penalties are clearly subject to Deficiency
Procedures, the penalties would not be imposed until tax years
subsequent to the year of the improper EITC claim. 148 However,

144. Id. at 395.
145. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2014-007 (Jul 31, 2014).
146. The two-year ban under section 32(k) applies when a taxpayer recklessly or intentionally
disregards the EITC rules. See I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). The ten-year ban applies when it is
determined that a taxpayer fraudulently claimed the EITC. See id. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i).
147. See id. § 32(k)(1).
148. The minimum penalty under section 32(k) is two years. See id. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii).
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taxpayers generally cannot utilize Deficiency Procedures until the IRS
issues a Notice of Deficiency, which may or may not happen in those
subsequent years. Thus, until those later years, there is no penalty ripe to
challenge. 149
Lastly, because the section 6676 penalty is not subject to
Deficiency Procedures, the taxpayer could not challenge that penalty
along with the other two. Instead, the taxpayer would have to either prepay the section 6676 penalty and pursue Refund Procedures, or wait
until the IRS initiated collection activities and pursue CDP Procedures,
which could lead the taxpayer back to the same Tax Court that was
precluded from hearing the section 6676 challenge in the first place. But
it gets worse – it is unclear how the penalty should be calculated.
C.

A Three Stooges Problem

The problems associated with the interplay between the Rand
decision and the calculation of section 6662 and 6676 penalties can be
shown using the four most famous members of the Three Stooges: Moe,
Larry, Shemp and Curly (each, a “Stooge”) (apologies to Joe and Curly
Joe). 150 Let us assume all the Stooges have a $1,000 tax liability and
request a $500 erroneous refund based on improperly claiming $1,500 of
different types of refundable credits. For example:
(1) Moe improperly claims $1,500 of refundable withholding credits
(section 31 or 33) and receives a $500 erroneous refund;
(2) Larry improperly claims $1,500 of FTHBC and receives a $500
erroneous refund;
(3) Curly improperly claims $1,500 of FTHBC, but the IRS denies
Curly’s erroneous $500 refund claim; and
(4) Shemp improperly claims $750 of EITC (section 32) and $750 of
FTHBC (section 36) and receives a $500 erroneous refund.

Under current law, each taxpayer would be penalized in a different
149. A detailed discussion of the procedural problems associated with section 32(k) penalties is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, see Leslie Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC: A
Problematic Penalty, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/
the-ban-on-claiming-the-eitc-a-problematic-penalty/.
150. Unbeknownst to many, Shemp was a member of the Stooges before Curly. Shemp left the
Stooges in 1934 and was replaced by Curly. It was also in 1934 that the Stooges adopted the
moniker the “Three Stooges.” Also, it should be noted that there were two additional members of
the Three Stooges, Joe Besser and Curly Joe DeRita. However, Moe, Larry, Shemp, and Curly
starred in the vast majority of films. See The Three Stooges, FILMOGRAPHY,
http://www.threestooges.com/filmography/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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way:
Moe
Moe would be liable for a $300 Section 6662 penalty.
Penalty Calculation—Section 6662
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000]-X[- $500] =
151
$1,500.
The “X” is -$500, the erroneously-paid $500 refund
claim.
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $300.

Penalty Defense
Moe would be able to challenge the penalty prior to payment
through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court, and may use the
reasonable cause defense. Moe could also pay the penalty and sue
for refund using Refund Procedures.

Larry
Larry would be liable for a $200 section 6662 penalty and a $100
section 6676 penalty.
Penalty Calculation—Section 6662
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000]—X[=0] = $1,000.
The underpayment is not affected by the refund because, pursuant
to Rand, refunds based on the FTHBC do not permit the “X” to go
below zero.
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $200.

Penalty Calculation—Section 6676
The section 6676 penalty is 20% of the $500 erroneous refund
claim, $100.

Penalty Defense
Larry would be able to challenge the section 6662 penalty prior to
151. The “Y” and the “Z” in this example, as well as the others that follow, are zero.
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payment through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court and may use
the reasonable cause defense. Larry could also pay the section
6662 penalty and sue for refund using Refund Procedures.
To challenge the section 6676 penalty, Larry could either (i) pay
the penalty and pursue Refund Procedures, or (ii) wait for the IRS
to initiate collection activities and pursue CDP Procedures. Larry
has no reasonable cause defense to the section 6676 penalty, and
must rely instead on the IRS determining his claim had a
reasonable basis.

Curly
Curly would be liable for a $100 section 6676 penalty.
Penalty Calculation—Section 6676
The section 6676 penalty is 20% of the $500 erroneous refund
claim, $100.

Penalty Defense
Curly can challenge the section 6676 penalty by either (i) paying
the penalty and pursuing Refund Procedures, or (ii) waiting for the
IRS to initiate collection activities and pursuing CDP Procedures.
Curly has no reasonable cause defense to the section 6676 penalty,
and must rely instead on the IRS determining his claim had a
reasonable basis.

Shemp
Shemp would be liable for three different penalties:
(1) a $200 Section 6662 penalty;
(2) a non-monetary EITC penalty; and
(3) a section 6676 penalty of between $0 and $100, but it is
unclear how that penalty would be calculated

(1) Penalty Calculation—Section 6662
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000] - X[$0] = $1,000.
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $200.

(1) Penalty Defense—Section 6662
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Shemp would be able to challenge the penalty prior to payment
through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court, and may use the
reasonable cause defense. Shemp could also pay the section 6662
penalty and sue for refund using Refund Procedures.

(2) Non-monetary EITC penalty—Section 32 (EITC)
Shemp would be subject to the non-monetary penalties under
section 32(k), either a two-year or ten-year ban from claiming the
152
EITC.

(2) Penalty Defense—Section 32 (EITC)
It is unclear what Shemp would be able to challenge regarding the
imposition of the section 32(k) penalty, as section 32(k) imposes
no penalty on the year of the improper conduct (the “conduct
year”), but only subsequent years (the “ban years”). In one case
touching on the issue, the Tax Court permitted the IRS to deny the
EITC for the conduct year, but ruled that the penalty was
inappropriate for the ban years because the taxpayer’s conduct was
153
not due to a “reckless or intentional disregard of the rules.” A
question left unanswered is whether the court would have
jurisdiction over those subsequent years if it found the taxpayer’s
conduct reckless, as no EITC claims for those subsequent years
were before the court.

(3) Penalty Calculation—Section 6676
Whether Shemp would be liable for a section 6676 penalty is far
from clear. Pursuant to section 6676(a), no portion of the section
6676 penalty can apply to the portion of a refund claim based on
154
the EITC. But what would that mean in Shemp’s case? Shemp
could legitimately argue that only the $750 of FTHBC should be
included in his penalty calculations, and the $750 EITC should be
ignored. By ignoring the EITC, the $750 FTHBC would act only
to reduce Shemp’s tax liability from $1,000 to $250, and, more
importantly, would not generate a refund. Thus, by Shemp’s logic,
no section 6676 penalty could apply because there was no refund
claim based solely on the FTHBC.

152. Section 32(k)(1)(A) provides for a “disallowance period” preventing taxpayers from
claiming the EITC for a period of years after a taxpayer improperly claims the EITC. The
disallowance period is either two or ten years, depending on the taxpayer’s culpability. See I.R.C. §
32(k)(B).
153. Garcia v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2013-28 (Apr. 3, 2013).
154. Claims for “refund or credit relating to the earned income credit under section 32” are
excluded in I.R.C. § 6676(a).
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Alternatively, the IRS could put forth two credible arguments:
IRS Argument 1: The IRS could argue that half of Shemp’s $500
refund is based on the FTHBC, and the other half is based on the
EITC. Thus, because 50% of the refund was based on the FTHBC, the
portion of the refund claim not attributable to the EITC (which cannot
be penalized pursuant to section 6676(a)) would be $250, and the
penalty would be $50 [= 20% x $250].
IRS Argument 2: The IRS could also take a more aggressive position:
that the EITC reduced Shemp’s putative tax liability to $250. Thus, the
$750 FTHBC generated the refund, and the entire $500 refund should
be penalized, generating a $100 penalty [= 20% x $500].

(3) Penalty Defense—Section 6676
Shemp would be able to challenge penalties under section 6662 and 32
through Deficiency Procedures. However, as in Larry’s case, Shemp
would not be able to challenge the section 6676 penalty unless he
either (i) pays the penalty and pursues Refund Procedures, or (ii) waits
for the IRS to initiate collection activities and pursues CDP
Procedures.
Shemp’s case, more than the others, highlights and raises major
problems in post-Rand penalty enforcement. It is no wonder the IRS
has been hesitant in imposing these Kafkaesque penalties on taxpayers.
Even if these mostly self-inflicted problems are corrected, others lurk
just over the horizon.

IV. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 6676
Enforcing section 6676 after Rand is, as demonstrated above,
challenging. However, Rand may be just the tip of the iceberg. Other
problems are just around the corner.
A.

Petition Clause Issues 155

Without careful implantation, section 6676 could violate the First
Amendment by putting a potential sanction on citizens’ ability to
petition the government. Among other protections, the First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of

155. The potential First Amendment issues appear to have been first articulated in a letter by
attorney Derek Ho to the IRS Commissioner arguing, inter alia, that section 6676 may violate the
petition clause of the First Amendment. See Derek Ho, Firm Cautions Against Unconstitutional
Enforcement of Penalty Provision, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 13, 2012, at 114-15.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/3

36

Wright: Bugus Refunds & Bad Penalties
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

BOGUS REFUNDS & BAD PENALTIES

10/21/2015 11:57 AM

583

the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”156
That language, known as the Petition Clause, serves two invaluable
purposes: it gives citizens a right to present their grievances against the
government, and it allows the government to obtain information
necessary to determine the validity of the grievances. 157 The Supreme
Court has consistently characterized the right to petition as inseparable
from the other cognate First Amendment rights of assembly, association,
and speech. 158
If the IRS chooses to impose section 6676 penalties without
providing taxpayers some basic protections, it could easily violate
taxpayers’ First Amendment protections. The basis of those protections,
and how implementation of section 6676 could violate those protections,
is explained below.
The right to petition the government predates the U.S. Constitution
by about fifty years. 159 One of the earliest cases to discuss the right to
petition in the First Amendment context is Crandall v. Nevada, decided
in 1867. 160 In Crandall, the State of Nevada sought to impose a tax on
travelers passing through the State. The Crandall Court found that such
a tax infringed on a traveler’s right to “assert any claim he may have
upon that government,” thereby implicating the right to petition. 161
Section 6676 raises the same issue.

156. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In English law, the right to petition reaches back at least to the
Magna Carta, which stated:
If we, our chief justice, our officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any man,
or transgress any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made known to
four of the said twenty-five barons, they shall come to us – or in our absence from the kingdom to
the chief justice – to declare it and claim immediate redress.
Magna Carta, ch. 61 (1215).
157. Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 96-100 (1977).
158. See, e.g., James B. Perrine, Defining the “Sham Litigation” Exception to the NoerrPennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v.
Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46 ALA. L. REV. 815, 835 (1995). See also Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (finding the right to petition as “inseparable” from the other
rights granted by the First Amendment and noting, “It was not by accident or coincidence that the
rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are
inseparable.”).
159. Fifty years before the Bill of Rights was adopted, the colonial assemblies treated the right
to petition as a right deserving protection. See Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law
Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1153, 1155 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government
for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22 (1993).
160. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).
161. Id.
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One long-recognized form of petitioning activity is seeking a tax
refund. 162 In Van Deelen v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
that “the right at issue—to petition the government for the redress of tax
grievances—has been with us and clearly established since the Sons of
Liberty visited Griffin’s Wharf in Boston.” 163 The Van Deelen court
discussed the breadth of the right to petition, noting that “the
constitutionally enumerated right of a private citizen to petition the
government for the redress of grievances does not pick and choose its
causes but extends to matters great and small, public and private.” 164 The
court also acknowledged that even if the seeking of relief is animated by
malevolence or self-interest, the First Amendment protects the right to
petition of the person whose activities are genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action. 165
The right to petition, like all constitutional rights, is not unfettered.
One of the first substantive restrictions on the right to petition arose in
1961 in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. (“Noerr”), in which the Supreme Court recognized, in
dicta, that the right to petition the government could be abridged if the
petitioning activity was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor.” 166 Four years later, the Supreme Court examined the
scope of permissible restrictions to petitioning activity in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington (“Pennington”) and held that a
person or firm is shielded from antitrust liability if the conduct at issue
162. See, e.g., Blacklock v. United States, 208 U.S. 75 (1907); United States v. Perkins, 163
U.S. 625 (1896).
163. Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007). The right to petition was
imported from English law and has been recognized as early as 1031, and a right to petition was
included in the Magna Carta. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1154-55:
The earliest petition recorded in our Anglo-American constitutional history is the English leaders’
petition in 1013 to Aethelred the Unready. . . . [The] Magna Carta of 1215, the fundamental source
of Anglo-American liberties, was the king’s response to the barons’ petition. This was one of
several royal charters granted by Medieval English kings to guarantee baronial privileges and, to a
lesser extent, popular rights. Petitioning as a right was specifically recognized in Magna Carta.
164. Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1153. The court went on to add that “a private citizen exercises a
constitutionally protected First Amendment right anytime he or she petitions the government for
redress; the petitioning clause of the First Amendment does not pick and choose its causes. The
minor and questionable, along with the mighty and consequential, are all embraced.” Id. at 1156.
165. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (quoting Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4, (1988)). Moreover, “Resort to
administrative, legislative, political or judicial processes is protected by the first amendment so long
as the petitioner is concerned with obtaining relief afforded by the system.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365
and California Motor Transport. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
166. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
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constitutes legitimate First Amendment petitioning activity. 167
After Noerr and Pennington, courts have shaped the contours of
attempted restrictions to the right to petition the government through
what has been called the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 168 The doctrine
holds generally that the act of petitioning the government deserves
especially broad protection from liability (often antitrust liability) in the
absence of proof that the petitioning activity is a “sham.” 169 The NoerrPennington doctrine seeks to maintain the equilibrium in the tradeoff
between deterring predatory activity and deterring petitioning activity. 170
167. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
168. The doctrine takes its name from the first two cases that the Supreme Court considered in
this jurisprudential line. See Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 and Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. In Noerr, a group
of trucking companies and their trade association filed an antitrust lawsuit against major railroads,
the presidents of those railroads, and their public relations firm. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
that the defendants had conspired to restrict trade and monopolize the long-distance freight business
in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ public relations firm
lobbied Congress with the sole purpose of injuring the truckers, harming their reputation, and
impeding their ability to compete against railroad companies. Id. at 129-30. The Court held that
when the railroads lobbied the government to pass laws restraining the trucking companies, they
were merely exercising their constitutional right to petition the government. Id. at 136. Although the
Court found no antitrust violation, it noted that antitrust laws may apply in cases where such
lobbying was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” Id. at 144.
169. See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen Petitions
with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 117 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Sham litigation
presents a problem because individuals or businesses “may use litigation solely as an attempt to
raise its rivals’ costs disproportionately, erect barriers to market entry, or facilitate collusive
behavior.” James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 70 (1985). Some courts have pushed the definition of
“petitioning”—the most fundamental limitation on the scope of Noerr immunity—to its limits,
stretching it to encompass even communications that entail no government involvement at all. This
view is best exemplified by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt.
Coastal States was alleged to be dealing in pirated oil illegally seized by the Libyan government
and, as a result, was the target of threats of litigation. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694
F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). These threats were directed at specific entities—including Coastal States,
its customers, and third party contractors—and published generally. Coastal States argued that the
threats—as opposed to the litigation itself—were not directed at the government and therefore could
not constitute immunized petitioning, but the Fifth Circuit held otherwise. Id. at 1367. According to
the court: “Given that petitioning immunity protects joint litigation, it would be absurd to hold that
it does not protect those acts reasonably and normally attendant upon effective litigation. The
litigator should not be protected only when he strikes without warning.” Id.
170. See Christopher C. Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context
of the Case Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 241, 245-51 (1986); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K.
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979) (arguing
that antitrust bans on predatory pricing must balance the benefit of deterring predatory pricing
against the cost of deterring desirable price-cutting). The same tradeoff is present for non-antitrust
doctrines that deal with the problem of frivolous suits and strategic litigation. See Ronald J. Gilson,
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 877-82
(1990) (arguing with respect to malicious prosecution and professional rules of conduct that any
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Courts have extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from
petitioning to various other claims made under both federal and state
law. 171 Although the sham petitioning exception was initially recognized
in Noerr, an exact definition of a sham petition was largely undefined
until in 1972, 172 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited (“California Motor Transport”). 173
California Motor Transport involved a dispute between two
trucking companies in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
conspired to injure plaintiff’s business by filing numerous lawsuits in
state and federal court. 174 The court focused on the defendant’s litigation
strategy, which it characterized as involving the institution of suits “with
or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.”175
In finding for the plaintiff, the court determined that the NoerrPennington doctrine was applicable not only to petitioning activities but
also to litigation activities. 176 Ultimately, the court decided that the
defendant’s litigation activities were a sham and thus outside of the
Noerr-Pennington immunity. 177
California Motor Transport was the Supreme Court’s first extended

definition of strategic litigation must trade off over- and under-inclusion); Avery Katz, The Effect of
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 26 (1990)
(concluding that the English rule of assessing legal expenses against the loser may help deter
frivolous suits, but only at the cost of deterring meritorious suits).
171. “Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was initially recognized in the antitrust field,
the federal courts have by analogy applied it to claims brought under both state and federal laws.”
Campbell v. PMI Food Equip. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 790 (6th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has
applied the PRE test to retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat.
81 (1968). See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
noted that “Noerr-Pennington is a label for a form of First Amendment protection; to say that one
does not have Noerr-Pennington immunity is to conclude that one’s petitioning activity is
unprotected by the First Amendment.” Id.
172. See Paul More, Protections against Retaliatory Employer Lawsuits after BE&K
Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 223 (2004).
173. California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
174. Id at 509.
175. Id. at 512.
176. Id. at 513:
Opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions, or
defenses and may readily call them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may
think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have
been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the
case is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz.,
effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the
administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire
immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of “political expression.”
177. Id. at 515-16.
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treatment of the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity. 178
In the following years, however, courts “wrestled with the boundaries of
the sham litigation exception.” 179 In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed
the scope of the sham litigation exception in Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”). 180 In PRE,
the court outlined a two-part definition of sham litigation, requiring the
litigation to be (1) “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits,” and (2) “an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.” 181 The court concluded that if the first test was satisfied, the
suit was “immunized under Noerr.” 182
The right to pursue all but objectively baseless petitions is a
necessary ingredient in the U.S. system of justice. 183 The NoerrPennington doctrine provides protection to petitioning activity unless
that activity is “objectively baseless” as set forth in PRE. However,
section 6676 sanctions refund requests “lacking a reasonable basis,” a
standard significantly higher than the “objectively baseless standard” set
forth in PRE. As such, absent some procedural safeguards, imposing the
section 6676 penalty could easily violate the First Amendment by
chilling a taxpayer’s rights to seek refund that is objectively nonbaseless.
As noted in Part II, the IRS appears to have adopted the “reasonable
basis” standard used in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3). Thus, the
IRS can impose a section 6676 penalty so long as it determines a refund
claim is not reasonably based on the specific types of authority outlined
178. The “sham” exception was first articulated in the Noerr case itself, in which the Supreme
Court held that there may be instances in which a petitioning effort “ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
179. More, supra note 172, at 224.
180. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)
[hereinafter PRE].
181. Id. at 60-61.
182. Id. at 60. The objectively baseless standard can be found in other areas as well,
particularly Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 11”). Rule 11 requires an
attorney in federal court to certify that, after reasonable inquiry, there is an adequate legal and
factual basis for submissions to the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Attorneys violating Rule 11 face
sanctions, and courts, in determining whether to impose those sanctions, apply standards consistent
with the “baseless” standard set forth by Justice Thomas in PRE. See, e.g., Jerold S. Solovy et al.,
Happy (?) Birthday Rule 11: Sanctions Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 727 (2004); Lisa Wood, In Praise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 18 ANTITRUST A.B.A.
72 (2003).
183. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 182.
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in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), which generally includes
the Code, existing, temporary, and proposed Treasury Regulations,
published IRS materials, and case law. 184 The reasonable basis standard
surely exceeds the “objectively baseless” standard articulated in PRE.
In addition to the higher standard, the lack of a means to challenge
the penalty prior to assessment exacerbates the First Amendment issue.
As noted above, section 6676 is an immediately assessable penalty with
no good faith defenses. As such, it is essentially an immediately
assessable strict liability penalty for taxpayers. Such penalties have been
deemed appropriate in limited circumstances. 185 Those circumstances
include situations in which “the prohibited activity ‘impairs the
efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently
constituted.’” 186
However, in circumstances in which a strict liability statute touches
on protected First Amendment activity (as is the case with section 6676),
the Supreme Court has noted that strict liability penalties may have the
effect of “inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual
the more reluctant to exercise it.” 187 The Court also added that First
Amendment protections are warranted to “assure to the freedoms of
speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful
exercise.” 188
Because of the potential chill a strict liability penalty could have on
protected First Amendment rights, courts generally require some
safeguards prior to the imposition of a penalty. 189 In fact, the “Ninth
Circuit has explained that [u]nder the Noerr-Pennington rule of statutory
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003).
185. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 610
(6th Cir. 2005). Most strict liability penalties are related to the regulation of motor vehicles,
commercial goods, or food and drug legislation where the safety and health of the public is of
ultimate concern. Id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1960)).
186. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 418 F.3d at 610 (citing Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)).
187. Smith, 361 U.S. at 151. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding
that the First Amendment protections at issue were “fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”).
188. Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)).
189. An exception to this general rule is commercial speech. See, e.g., American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 418 F.3d at 611 n.7 (“the Supreme Court has held that the usual concern of
chilling protected speech ‘applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context.’ Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). Strict liability regimes regulating commercial speech
have thus been approved because ‘the economic motivations that inspire advertising neutralize the
fear that protected speech will be chilled.’” Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless
Pers. Comm., L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 812 (M.D. La. 2004)).
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construction, we must construe federal statutes so as to avoid burdening
conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause
unless the statute clearly provides otherwise.” 190 Section 6676 lacks such
a safeguard.
The refund claims of Fraudsters deserve no First Amendment
protection because they are, by their very nature, objectively baseless.
However, refund claims of Strivers and Gamers often fall short of being
“objectively baseless.” Instead, those refund claims, based on errors of
law or fact, will often have some objective, albeit erroneous, basis. As
such, any infringement on their right to claim that non-baseless refund
must be afforded some minimum First Amendment protections. As
drafted, section 6676 offers no such protections.
B.

Imperfect Claims for Refund

Another problem with section 6676 is that the IRS, through
informal guidance to its employees, sought to broaden the reach of
section 6676 by extending its reach to inchoate refund claims. As set
forth below, there is no legal or policy justification for the IRS’s actions.
The IRS has asserted that the section 6676 penalty applies to
informal claims for refunds, 191 i.e., refund claims that fail to meet the
formal requirements of the law governing refund claims. 192 However, no
court has had the opportunity to opine on the matter, and nothing in the
Code or Treasury Regulations supports the IRS’s position. Moreover,
the IRS’s position opens a Pandora’s box of thorny legal issues for the
IRS and could ultimately cause the IRS more harm than good.
The rules determining what constitutes a valid refund claim are
delineated in the Code and regulations, to wit: a legally sufficient claim
for refund must set forth, in a written declaration that is executed under
penalties of perjury, each ground upon which a refund is claimed and
facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis of the
claim. 193 Claims for refund must generally be filed “within [three] years
from the time the return was filed or [two] years from the time the tax
190. See Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Sosa,
437 F.3d at 931).
191. See IRM 20.1.5.16(3) (Jan. 24, 2012) (“The [section 6676] penalty applies to all claims,
formal and informal, relating to federal income taxes.”).
192. Treasury regulations set forth the requirements for a valid claim for refund. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977); id. § 301.6402-3(a) (as amended in 2014).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2. The regulations do offer some flexibility for less-thancomplete compliance with the rules and permit the IRS to consider claims, provided the taxpayer
sets forth detailed grounds upon which the refund is claimed and a factual basis for the claim and
includes a jurat. See id. § 301.6402-2(b)(1).
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was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later.” 194 To request a
refund consistent with section 6511, taxpayers may either claim a refund
on the tax return itself, or file an amended return claiming the refund. 195
Although the law states that claims for refund failing to comply
with the regulatory requirements will not be considered, courts, “with
the IRS’s reluctant acquiescence,” have fashioned an equitable remedy
for taxpayers failing to meet the strict legal and regulatory
requirements—the informal claim doctrine. 196 The informal claim
doctrine allows taxpayers to toll “the statute of limitations related to
refund claims when a taxpayer puts the Service ‘on notice’ of a pending
refund claim, but fails to satisfy the formalities outlined in the
regulations for filing a valid claim.” 197 For an informal claim to be
considered adequate, courts and the IRS generally require the claim to (i)
be in writing, (ii) apprise the IRS that a refund is being claimed, and (iii)
specify the tax and the year or years for which the refund is being
sought. 198
The Supreme Court first recognized the informal claim doctrine in
1941, and the doctrine has been recognized by the courts and the IRS
ever since. 199 In cases in which the informal claim doctrine has been
applied, the courts have required taxpayers to supplement their informal
194. See I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2012), which states:
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax
the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time
the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the
later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time which the tax was paid.
195. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3. “A return or amended return shall constitute a claim for refund
or credit if it contains a statement setting forth the amount determined as an overpayment and
advising [the Internal Revenue Service] whether such amount shall be refunded to the taxpayer or
shall be applied as a credit.” Id. § 301.6402-3(a)(5).
196. See BCS Fin. Corp. v. United States, 118 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1997).
197. See United States v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 874 F.2d 1165, 1175-76 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely
letter with the IRS that requested a refund and, subsequently, filed a formal refund claim). See also
William A. Neilson, Informal Claims For Refund—A Winding Road, 26 AKRON TAX J. 147, 148
(2011).
198. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 11.08[2];
see also Neilson, supra note 197, at 152.
199. See United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941), holding:
A notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which
the Commissioner could reject because too general or because it does not comply with
formal requirements of the statute and regulations, will nevertheless be treated as a claim
where formal defects and lack of specificity have been remedied by amendment filed
after the lapse of the statutory period.
See also AmBase Corp. v. United States, 731 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2013); Furst v. United States,
678 F.2d 147, 151 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 318
F.2d 915, 923 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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claims with proper formal claims before initiating litigation, to give the
government a “full opportunity to address the problem
administratively.” 200 In effect, the courts have required the filing of a
valid refund claim as a prerequisite to application of the informal claims
doctrine.
The IRS’s decision to apply section 6676 penalties to informal
claims is contrary to that history. As a preliminary matter, the IRS’s
position runs contrary to the Code and Treasury regulations. Section
6676, on its face, applies only to a taxpayer’s “claim for refund,” and the
rules governing claims for refund can be found in section 6511 and its
implementing regulations. Implicit in those rules is the assumption that
“claims for refund,” as used in section 6511 and its regulations, means
valid claims for refund. Otherwise, section 6511 would stand for the
absurd proposition that its rules apply to invalid claims, which would
obviate the need for a definition of valid claims.
If you accept that the validity of a claim is an implicit assumption
in 6511, as a matter of statutory construction, the same rule should be
applied to section 6676, absent evidence to the contrary. 201 No such
evidence exists. Moreover, nothing in what little legislative history
exists with respect to section 6676 indicates, or even suggests, that
invalid refund claims should fall within the purview of the penalty.
More damning is Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-2(b)(1), which
directly contradicts the IRS’s position, stating that a refund claim that
fails to comply with the formal requirements of a refund claim “will not
be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund.” 202 If the IRS
sought to impose the section 6676 penalty for an informal refund claim,
no court would likely rule in the IRS’s favor. That, however, is not the
end of the discussion.
C.

An Avoidable Penalty
“Only the little people pay taxes”
—Leona Helmsley

The above quote, attributable to the “Queen of Mean,” 203 is not
200. Greene-Thapedi v. United States, 549 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing BCS Fin.
Corp., 118 F.3d at 524-25).
201. For a detailed examination of the statutory construction of tax statutes, see Michael
Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991).
202. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977) (emphasis added).
203. Leona Helmsley was nicknamed the “Queen of Mean” in various periodicals, and that
nickname was memorialized by a 1990 movie of her life, aptly titled, Leona Helmsley: the Queen of
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true, 204 but it may be accurate with respect to those from whom the IRS
will collect section 6676 penalties. As drafted, section 6676 penalties
may be entirely avoidable through procedural planning. One such
strategy, set forth below, requires a fairly sophisticated understanding of
tax procedure. As such, for all practical purposes, only taxpayers who
can afford tax counsel can likely avail themselves of it, resulting in
penalty enforcement primarily against the Strivers, i.e., “the little
people” referenced by Helmsley above.
One method for avoiding the penalty, outlined in a 2011 Tax Notes
article, 205 is as follows:
1. Taxpayer files a federal tax return without the transaction that
may give rise to the refund (the “Questionable Transaction”).
2. Taxpayer files an amended tax return seeking only a nominal
portion of the benefits of the Questionable Transaction. In the
amended return, the taxpayer discloses all the relevant legal and
factual issues regarding the Questionable Transaction, but seeks
only some small portion of the Questionable Transaction’s tax
benefits.
3. Taxpayer waits to see what the IRS does:
a) if the IRS accepts the taxpayer’s request, the taxpayer then
requests the full amount;
b) if the IRS denies the taxpayer’s request, the taxpayer files
a refund suit, requesting full amount of Questionable

Mean (CBS television broadcast Sept. 23, 1990). See IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0100004
(last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
204. According to the Congressional Budget Office, for 2010 (the latest year available as of
this writing), “[h]ouseholds in the top quintile (including the top percentile) paid 68.8 percent of all
federal taxes, households in the middle quintile paid 9.1 percent, and those in the bottom quintile
paid 0.4 percent of federal taxes.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES, 2010, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/44604-AverageTaxRates.pdf.
205. See Donald B. Susswein, Is There a Disclosure Exception to the Economic Substance
Penalty?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 14, 2011, at 221-13. See also Gerald A. Kafka & Paul B.
Hynes, Jr, Recent Developments to Consider When Filing Formal and Informal Claims for Refund,
2011 TAX EXECUTIVES INST. 137, available at http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Pages/TTE-MJ11Recent-Developments-to-Consider-When-Filing-Formal-and-Informal-Claims-for-Refund.aspx.
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Transaction’s tax benefits. 206
Under this scenario, the IRS would be able to assert the section
6676 penalty only if it denied the taxpayer’s request, but the penalty
would apply only to the nominal portion of the Questionable
Transaction’s tax benefits that would have generated a refund. This is
because section 6676 applies only to IRS administrative refunds, not
refunds requested in litigation. 207 Thus, because the full refund claim
was not made to the IRS, but instead to a court in a refund action, the
IRS could not seek to impose the section 6676 penalty to the full amount
of the Questionable Transaction’s tax benefits that generated the
potential refund.
A reasonable question at this point is what would happen if the IRS
accepted the claim. If it never challenged the transaction, the taxpayer
would keep all the Questionable Transaction’s tax benefits. If the IRS
later determined that the transaction’s tax benefits should have been
denied, the IRS would be hard-pressed to argue that a taxpayer relying
on the IRS’s own determination (i.e., the initial decision accepting the
Questionable Transaction’s benefits) did not have a reasonable basis. For
taxpayers, it would be a “heads I win, tails you lose” gambit.
One potential problem for a taxpayer seeking to use this strategy
could be the variance doctrine, which bars taxpayers from raising new
issues relating to their tax claims unless the new issue is “derived from
or is integral to the ground timely raised in the [initial] refund claim.” 208
The variance doctrine is derived from Treasury regulations that require
taxpayers to set forth specific grounds for their refund claims. 209
It is unclear how a court would view the taxpayer in this
circumstance. On the one hand, the taxpayer has, as the regulation
requires, “set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is

206. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (2012), the taxpayer must generally wait six months
before filing a refund suit.
207. Id.
208. Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1139 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
209. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977), which states:
No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of
limitation applicable to the ﬁling of a claim therefor except upon one or more of the
grounds set forth in a claim ﬁled before the expiration of such period. The claim must set
forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufﬁcient
to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. . . . A claim which does not
comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund
or credit.
See also United States v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 283 U.S. 269, 270 (1931); J.P. Stevens Engraving Co.
v. United States, 53 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1931).
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claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact
basis [of the refund claim],” by disclosing all the relevant legal and
factual issues regarding the Questionable Transaction. 210 In such a case,
the taxpayer would appear to have satisfied the variance doctrine
requirements, as there would be no “new” factual or legal theories at
issue. 211
On the other hand, the IRS could argue that there is substantial
factual variance from the filed refund claims and the refund claim before
the court, namely the difference between the nominal refund request to
the IRS, and the full refund request before the court. Whether a court
would side with the IRS here is unknown. At least one writer, however,
has noted that the strategy is “risky.” 212
V. A BETTER REFUND PENALTY
Section 6676, which was enacted to deter Fraudsters and Gamers,
fails miserably at meeting its intended targets. Instead, it created more
work for the government, and, judging by the increase in bogus refund
schemes, may have emboldened those seeking to cheat the government
through the bogus refund schemes described in Part I.
Despite its failures, however, a properly implemented section 6676
penalty could fill the gap in the current penalty regime exposed by the
Rand court. Absent section 6676, there would be no effective sanction
on filing erroneous (as opposed to fraudulent) refund claims. Thus, at the
margins, rational taxpayers would be encouraged to push the envelope
by taking aggressive positions because there would be little sanction to
such behavior. An effective penalty would seek to balance the IRS need
210. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). Courts have found that the requirement “is designed both
to prevent surprise and to give adequate notice to the [IRS] of the nature of the claim and the
specific facts upon which it is predicated, thereby permitting an administrative investigation and
determination.” Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States, 454 F.2d 1379, 1383, 197 Ct. Cl. 219 (Ct. Cl.
1972)). See also Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1352, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 437, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co.,
283 U.S. 269); Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 13, 17-18 (1940); Int’l
Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 56 F.2d 708 (Ct. Cl. 1932); The Midvale Co. v. United
States, 138 F. Supp. 269 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961));
Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1969) (“Thus, if the claim fairly
apprises the Service of the ground on which recovery is sought or if the Service actually considers
the ground later sought to be raised the claim will be held adequate for . . . bringing suit under §
7422.”); Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108 (1983).
211. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Ottawa Silica Co., 699 F.2d at 1139.
212. See Coder, supra note 109.
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to discourage overly aggressive refund claims with taxpayers’ freedom
not to “pay more than the law demands.” 213
Fortunately, many of the problems associated with section 6676 can
be corrected, and the IRS and Treasury can make the gravamen of the
necessary changes without congressional intervention. However, to
make section 6676 effective, Congress needs to step in.
In section IV.A, I will outline the steps the IRS and Treasury can
take to correct the most glaring problems associated with the penalty. It
is up to Congress to do the rest, and those steps are outlined in section
IV.B.
A. Administrative Changes
1. Fix the First Amendment Issue
The government should first address the First Amendment issue by
providing a mechanism to challenge section 6676 penalties prior to
assessment. Section 6676 has two related First Amendment problems:
(1) the reasonable basis standard is contrary to PRE, and (2) section
6676, lacking a right to a pre-assessment challenge, unduly burdens
taxpayers’ ability to petition the government. Although both problems
touch on the constitutional issues, both do not necessarily need to be
corrected. Rather, allowing a pre-assessment challenge (while retaining
the reasonable basis standard) would likely be enough to pass
constitutional muster. Moreover, such a change could be easily
implemented and would not require an act of Congress.
a. Provide a Pre-Assessment Challenge
To ameliorate the First Amendment concerns while retaining the
reasonable basis standard, the IRS and Treasury should provide
taxpayers with the right to challenge the penalty prior to assessment.
Although section 6676 falls within the sections of the Code that permit
immediately assessable penalties (Subtitle F, Chapter 68, Subchapter B:
Assessable Penalties (“Subchapter B”)), nothing in the Code precludes
the IRS and Treasury from providing a pre-assessment challenge to the
penalty. 214 In fact, one Subchapter B penalty permits a reasonable cause
exception to the penalty, which implicitly recognizes a pre-assessment

213. Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
214. Section 6676 was enacted in Subchapter B of Chapter 68 of the Code. The rules for
Subchapter B are found in section 6671. See I.R.C. §§ 6671, 6676 (2012).
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right for taxpayers to challenge the penalty. 215
What type of pre-assessment challenge? Some commenters have
argued that section 6676 penalties should be subject to Deficiency
Procedures, giving taxpayers the right to challenge the penalty as any
other return-related penalty. 216 Others have argued that section 6664 be
amended to include refundable tax credit disallowances in full, so 6662
penalties would apply in the Rand-type case. 217 The former, in addition
to requiring an act of Congress, 218 is both unwarranted and unnecessary.
The latter, as noted infra, would make section 6676 a better penalty.
Deficiency Procedures presuppose tax deficiencies and provide
protections to taxpayers based on the positions they take on returns
accepted by the IRS. 219 Unlike other tax penalties, however, section
6676 penalties are based on mere claims for refund. 220 There is no
requirement that the claim for refund be based on a tax deficiency, as
may be the case in frozen refund situations. Thus, Deficiency Procedures
are inappropriate, as they would layer the penalty with additional and
unnecessary requirements, and would require the introduction of a slew
of procedures not required to address erroneous refund claims. More
importantly, Deficiency Procedures would also significantly decrease the
immediacy of the penalty, which could be a useful tool to discourage
taxpayers from making overly aggressive erroneous refund claims.

215. The reasonable cause defense requires taxpayers to make an affirmative showing of all the
facts the taxpayer contends provide reasonable cause. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as
amended in 2004).
216. See, e.g., Sharon M. Fisk & Heather Kim Lee, Section 6676 Erroneous Claim for Refund
or Credit Penalty: The Penalty Has No Reasonable Basis, 1 TAX DEV. J. 26 (2009).
217. See Carlton M. Smith, IRS Wrongly Ignores the 20 Percent Excessive Refund Penalty,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 27, 2013, at 39-10.
218. Because section 6676 is in Subchapter B, to permit Deficiency Procedures, Congress
would either have to renumber section 6676 to include it in Subtitle F, Chapter 63 (possibly by
adding the penalty to section 6662) or change the law to allow taxpayers to challenge the penalty
through Deficiency Procedures.
219. “Deficiency” is defined generally in the Code as the difference between the correct tax
and the tax reported on a return. See I.R.C. § 6211(a). For individuals who fail to file returns, the
Code permits the IRS to make a return, generally referred to as a “Substitute For Return” (“SFR”),
which will be treated as that person’s return for tax purposes. See id. § 6020(b)(1). It is not until
after the SFR has been filed that the IRS can issue a Notice of Deficiency. See Leslie Book, Notice
of Deficiency in Substitute for Return Setting, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/notice-of-deficiency-in-substitute-for-return-setting/
(“IRS
generally cannot assess tax based upon the liability in the SFR until it issues a statutory notice of
deficiency giving the taxpayer the right to petition the Tax Court.”). See also Claudia Hill & Frank
Degen, Nat’l Ass’n Enrolled Agents, Presentation at the IRS Nationwide Tax Forum: Dealing with
SFRs and ASFRs -Substitutes for Returns—IRC 6020(b) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013_NTF_Dealing_with_SFRs.pdf.
220. See I.R.C. § 6676.
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A better solution would be to provide taxpayers with an explicit
right to challenge the section 6676 penalty. Such a right could retain the
reasonable basis standard (though, as argued infra, that is not the best
standard), but provide a clear mechanism for taxpayers to make their
case to the IRS. Such a right would likely solve the potential First
Amendment issues, as it would give taxpayers a clear means to avoid the
immediate imposition of the penalty. Such a right, coupled with a
taxpayer’s ability to utilize either CDP or Refund Procedures, should be
enough to overcome the First Amendment concerns.
b. Reasonable Basis v. Objectively Baseless?
One possible First Amendment solution would be to change the law
and adopt the objectively baseless standard, making only refund claims
that fail the standard subject to penalty. The objectively baseless
standard, consistent with PRE, would require the government to show
that no reasonable taxpayer could expect success on the merits. The
objectively baseless standard may well work for Fraudster refund
claims; however, for claims based on errors of fact or law (i.e., Strivers
and Gamers refund claims), that standard would not provide much
deterrence, as any non-baseless claim would escape penalty.
The rules of eligibility for refundable tax credits are often complex,
requiring taxpayers to make sometimes intricate determinations and tax
calculations. A properly functioning refund claim penalty would ask
taxpayers to determine carefully the merits of their claim before
requesting a refund based on refundable credits. However, by lowering
the bar to the objectively baseless standard, taxpayers would have less
incentive to exercise care in determining their eligibility for credits.
Thus, taxpayers who would otherwise have exercised more care (to
avoid the penalty) will be dis-incentivized to exercise care if they would
be penalized only for objectively baseless refund claims. Simply stated,
changing the standard to objectively baseless is not the best option.
Adopting PRE’s objectively baseless standard, which would require
an act of Congress, would be a waste of both time and effort. Providing a
pre-assessment challenge, which fits into the IRS’s mission to
administer the tax laws, would allow the IRS to do its job while avoiding
the First Amendment issues.
2.

Clarify the Law in Regulations

Treasury should adopt regulations that provide explicit rules
regarding how section 6676 should be implemented. As the Rand case

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

51

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

598

10/21/2015 11:57 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:547

demonstrates, the absence of regulation can lead to unintended results, as
demonstrated in the Three Stooges example above, with at least four
different penalty combinations for what is essentially the same behavior.
Such an outcome could have been avoided entirely had Treasury issued
regulations mandating that refundable credits be included in
underpayment calculations.
The power to issue those regulations is well within Treasury’s
purview. 221 Generally, if a statute is deemed ambiguous about a
particular matter, a regulatory agency is free to issue regulations
clarifying the ambiguity. 222 The fact that the Tax Court has ruled
contrary to the IRS position should not be a hindrance to issuing
regulations, because as long as regulation is entitled to Chevron
deference (i.e., the statute does “directly address the precise question at
issue”), 223 the regulation can overturn a contrary judicial decision. 224
To make section 6676 more effective, two specific regulatory
changes are warranted: (1) define underpayment to include refundable
tax credits; and (2) exclude non-perfected refund claims from the
penalty.
a. Underpayment Definition
The aftermath of Rand provided the IRS with a choice regarding
how best to proceed in seeking to implement the section 6676 penalty:
(1) appeal Rand and pursue what will likely be vexatious litigation
around the country, or (2) issue regulations that include refundable
credits in the underpayment calculation. One choice will be costly, time
consuming, and wasteful; the other will likely resolve the issue once and
221. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), in
which the Supreme Court held that courts (1) apply Chevron deference to Treasury regulations and
defer to such regulations if they reasonably resolve a statutory ambiguity, (2) defer to all Treasury
regulations, whether issued pursuant to the general grant of rulemaking authority or pursuant to a
more specific congressional grant of rulemaking authority, and (3) ignore the history of the
regulation, such as whether it represents a reversal of Treasury policy or whether it was issued in
response to government litigation losses, in determining whether a regulation is valid.
222. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(“Brand X”). See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (U.S.
2013) (citing with approval Brand X’s holding that “it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory
gaps.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.).
223. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron
deference requires courts to defer to an administrative agency’s regulations if Congress has not
“spoken directly to the precise question at issue” and the regulation is based on a “permissible
construction of the statute.” Richard Lipton & Russell Young, COURTS SPLIT ON VALIDITY OF
SECTION 6501(E)(1)(A) REGULATIONS AFTER MAYO FOUNDATION, 115 J. TAX’N 21, 26 (2011).
224. Lipton & Young, supra note 223, at 27.
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for all.
Assuming the IRS chooses to appeal Rand and wins (i.e., the court
allows the IRS to include refundable credits in the underpayment
calculation), little will be resolved. Pursuant to the Golsen rule, the Tax
Court will follow its own precedent unless a case is appealable to a U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals that disagrees with it on a legal issue. 225 Thus,
the IRS would have to determine penalties on a circuit-by-circuit basis
unless and until all circuits are in agreement or the Supreme Court
resolves the issue. Such a strategy would unnecessarily burden both
taxpayers and the IRS. In addition, based on its prior actions enforcing
the section 6662 penalties, the IRS could choose simply to apply the
penalty broadly and ask the courts to figure it out, generating vexation,
and unnecessary litigation. 226
If Treasury instead issued regulations stating that any refundable
credits should be included in “the amount shown as the tax by the
taxpayer on his return” (the “X” in the underpayment calculation) 227 and
that such amount could be negative, the issue could be resolved. In fact,
the Tax Court almost invited Treasury to draft a regulation, noting that
the court was “not resolving the question of whether the Secretary may
promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with this Opinion.” 228
b. Penalize Only Valid Refund Claims
The IRS should explicitly remove informal claims from the
purview of section 6676 penalties. As noted above, the IRS has claimed
in internal guidance (albeit without providing a legal basis) that informal
claims for refund are subject to section 6676 penalties, 229 and it has not
225. Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), aff’d on another issue, 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir. 1971). See also Moosally v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 10, 16 n.7 (2014) (citing Golsen, 54 T.C.
at 757) (holding Golsen “established the rule that this Court will ‘follow a Court of Appeals
decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals’”).
226. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 124, at 187 (report on improper section
6662 penalty assessment after the 2012 guidance). To be fair, the IRS appears to be directing its
attorneys handling refundable credit cases with section 6662 penalties to notify the taxpayer if the
IRS is pursuing a larger penalty than what would apply under Rand. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT,
supra note 9; see also Carl Smith, Another Update on Rand Cases in Tax Court, PROCEDURALLY
TAXING (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/another-update-on-rand-cases-in-taxcourt/.
227. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 2007).
228. Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376, 384-85 (2013). In a footnote, the court also stated that
“[i]f the Secretary should promulgate such a regulation, we may be called upon to revisit that
question, but judicial restraint dictates that we not resolve that question now.” Id at 385 n.6
(citations omitted).
229. See Part IV.B.
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publicly stated whether the penalty applies to protective claims. Neither
informal nor protective claims should be penalized under section 6676.
As a preliminary matter, the requirements for a valid claim for
refund can be found in the Code and Treasury regulations, which set
forth, in detail, what the IRS should consider a valid claim for refund.
On the opposite spectrum are informal claims, where there are no
statutory or regulatory definitions. 230 What has emerged for informal
claims, in the place of explicit laws and regulations, are equitable
principles permitting taxpayers to extend the applicable statute of
limitations in cases in which they failed to meet the requirements of a
formal claim. 231
The problem for the IRS, if it seeks to impose penalties on informal
claims, is that a taxpayer may, as noted above, point out that “claim for
refund,” as set forth in the Code and Treasury regulations, has a precise
definition, and that definition necessarily excludes informal claims.
Thus, the IRS has no authority to penalize informal claims, because a
plain reading of section 6676 excludes anything other than valid refund
claims. Allowing the IRS to penalize informal claims gives it too much
unchecked power against taxpayers who may lack the ability and
wherewithal to challenge what would likely be viewed by a court as an
illegal penalty.
B.

Change the Law

If Congress could be moved to change section 6676 in order to
make it a better penalty, at least three changes are warranted. The first,
providing a reasonable cause defense, would make the penalty more fair
for unsophisticated taxpayers while not impacting the IRS’s ability to
penalize Fraudsters. The second, eliminating the economic substance
penalty, would benefit the IRS generally by avoiding unnecessary, and
potentially harmful, litigation. The last, providing a three year statute of
limitations for non-fraudulent refund claims, would provide clarity for
the Strivers, yet give the IRS the same ability to pursue Fraudsters it has
with others forms of tax fraud.
1. Provide a Reasonable Cause Defense
As noted above, a reasonable cause defense was originally provided
230. See [Tax Practice and Procedure] Tax Prac. Series (BNA) ¶ 3890.01.C.3.
231. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 149 (“informal claim doctrine has been subjected to
numerous interpretations, and courts have been inconsistent in determining what actually qualifies
as an informal claim for refund”).
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in the 2007 JCT Report, but was left out of the final bill. 232 Generally,
reasonable cause allows for legal and factual mistakes, whereas
reasonable basis requires reliance on persuasive legal authority. 233 As
noted by the IRS, “the reasonable cause and good faith exception in
[Treas. Reg.] § 1.6664-4 may provide relief from the penalty for
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, even if a return position
does not satisfy the reasonable basis standard.” 234
For taxpayers seeking to navigate the rules regarding refundable
credits, reasonable basis is too rigid a standard. When reasonable basis is
first introduced in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3, it is in the context of
the negligence definition, and is defined as the opposite of negligence,
noting that “a return position that has a reasonable basis . . . is not
attributable to negligence.” 235 That language captures the essence of the
problem with the reasonable basis standard in the section 6676 context:
it is a black and white solution to a problem with shades of gray, and
will ensnare too many taxpayers in its net.
2. Remove the Economic Substance Penalty
“The rich hire lawyers and accountants for a reason—to slip the tab
and stick you with the bill.”

—Pres. George W. Bush 236
The second change is to remove subsection (c), the penalty
applicable to refunds based on transactions lacking economic substance.
While arguably well-intentioned, more effective procedures exist to
combat tax shelters, and the likely result of enforcing this portion of
section 6676 will be to create bad precedent for the IRS.
As a preliminary matter, section 6676(c) is ill-targeted. Generally,
as noted above, taxpayers enter sophisticated tax shelters not to generate
refunds but to avoid tax. 237 That tax avoidance is generally done by
232. See supra note 103.
233. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) (as amended in 2003); id. §
1.6664-4(a).
234. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 20125201F (Dec. 28, 2012).
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1).
236. President George W. Bush, Campaign Remarks in Mason City, Iowa (Oct. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct20.html. For a list of
other quotes, see DUBYASPEAK.COM, http://www.dubyaspeak.com/campaigner (last visited Apr. 5,
2015).
237. See U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial
Professionals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs,
108th Cong. 146 app. (2003) (“In the broadest sense, a tax shelter is a device used to reduce or
eliminate the tax liability of the tax shelter user. . . . These transactions have no economic substance
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creating or inflating losses or deductions, not generating refunds.238
Moreover, taxpayers who participate in tax shelter activity often have
high incomes or large gains to shelter, and are generally ineligible for
refundable tax credits, which often have income limits. 239
The originally-enacted section 6676 was narrowly tailored to
address refund fraud. Extending the reach of the penalty to tax shelter
transactions, done as a sort-of kitchen sink amendment in 2010, adds
nothing to the IRS’s ability to combat bogus refund schemes, and may
cause more harm than good. That harm would be in the form of bad
precedent for the IRS regarding section 6676, generated by sophisticated
taxpayers challenging the numerous flaws in the law. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Homes stated long ago, “Great cases like hard cases make bad
law.” 240
Section 6676 is particularly open to such bad precedent, because so
many of the relevant terms in the penalty are undefined. This Article has
identified a number of those issues: can the IRS penalize informal
claims? what is the relevant statute of limitation? potential First
Amendment issues? how should an “excessive amount” be calculated if
there are multiple penalties? etc. The armies of lawyers representing the
Gamers will find more, all at the government’s expense.
The risk is even greater in this circumstance, because litigation of a
section 6676(c) economic substance penalty would give taxpayers an
added ability to define the contours of the codified economic substance
doctrine. To date, the IRS has been cautious in its approach to applying
economic substance penalties. 241 Such caution is understandable, as
economic substance has so much overlap with the other common law
doctrines. 242 Seeking to impose the section 6676(c) penalty would throw
that caution to the wind. Moreover, as I hope to argue in an upcoming
paper, the “any similar rule of law” language, if the IRS decides to take
it off the shelf, gives the IRS ample tools to combat tax shelters.
or business purpose other than to reduce or eliminate a person’s tax liability.”).
238. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported to Congress in 2003 that the tax losses from
abusive tax shelters totaled $85 billion. See id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
239. In 2013, the income limit for the EITC was $46,227 for an individual with three or more
qualifying children. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(3)(A) (2012). The FTHBC limit for individuals was
$145,000. See id. § 36(b)(2).
240. N. Sec. Co. v United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
241. The IRS requires the economic substance penalties under section 6662(b)(6) to be
approved by the Director of Field Operations before the penalty can even be proposed. See I.R.S.
Guidance LMSB-20-0910-024 (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Codification-of-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties; I.R.S. Guidance LB&I-40711-015, supra note 87.
242. See supra note 58.
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3. Create a Three Year Statute of Limitations for Non-Fraudulent
Refund Claims
A three year statute of limitations gives the IRS ample opportunity
to address non-fraudulent refund claims. Moreover, it would provide
clear guidelines for Strivers regarding the rules applicable to refund
claims, and be consistent with the IRS’s own internal guidance.
However, because taxpayers cannot rely upon that guidance, the statute
of limitations should be formalized in law.
Unlike Strivers refund claims, Fraudster refund claims do not
deserve a defined statute of limitations. Current law and regulations
provide that proof of fraud prevents the running of the statute of
limitations. 243 Consistent with that principle, penalties for fraudulent
refund claims pursuant to section 6676 penalties should not be subject to
a statute of limitations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 6676 could be an effective penalty, giving the IRS the
ability to discourage aggressive taxpayer behavior. However, poor
drafting and implementation have hamstrung the IRS, and rendered the
penalty relatively useless. The steps identified above would benefit both
taxpayers and the IRS in fairly administering the penalty and avoiding
many of the uncovered (and soon-to-be discovered) problems with the
penalty.

243. See I.R.C. § 6501(c), providing that in cases of false and fraudulent returns, taxes may be
assessed “at any time.” See also Evans v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 (2010); Hicks Co. v.
Comm’r, 56 T.C. 982, 1030 (1971), aff’d 470 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1972).
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